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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes important decisions
rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to indicate cases of first impression and cases that significantly
affect earlier interpretations of North Dakota Law. The Review was
written by James R. Salisbury and Richard M. Schreiber as a special
project for the NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -SUSPENSION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE
MAHER V. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
In Maher v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,' the
Department of Transportation appealed the district court's reversal of
the Department's suspension of Timothy Maher's driving privileges.2
On October 15, 1994, a North Dakota State Highway Patrol officer
observed Maher driving erratically.3 The officer stopped the car, admin-
istered several field sobriety tests to Maher, and then, based on these tests,
arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol.4 Maher was
then transported to a Mandan hospital for a blood test.5 At the hospital,
a registered nurse, using the "vacutainer" tube from a blood collection
kit provided to the hospital by the Department, attempted to draw blood
from Maher's right arm. 6 Because no blood was collected from this
initial attempt, the vacutainer and blood collection kit were discarded. 7
A second kit was opened and a blood sample was obtained from Maher.8
The second kit was sent to the Director of the Department of Transporta-
tion, in accordance with North Dakota Century Code section
39-20-03.1(3), where testing revealed a blood alcohol concentration of
0.21 percent. 9 Maher then made a timely request for an administrative
hearing.10
At the administrative hearing, Maher first objected to the introduc-
tion of the arresting officer's statement that "the time of the stop,
according to state radio, was 1:23 a.m.," arguing that it was hearsay."l
This objection was overruled and the statement was admitted. 12 Maher
also argued that the Department was divested of jurisdiction to suspend
his license due to the Department's failure to forward the initial empty
blood collection kit.13 Ultimately the hearing officer found that Maher's
blood was drawn within two hours of driving, his blood-alcohol content
was above 0.10 percent, and that sending the first empty blood collection
kit would have been a "useless and idle gesture." Thus the hearing
officer concluded that Maher had violated section 39-08-01 of the North
1. 539 N.W.2d 300 (N.D. 1995).










12. Maher, 539 N.W.2d at 301.
13. Id.
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Dakota Century Code and suspended Maher's driver's license for 365
days. 14
Maher appealed this decision to the district court, where the district
court reversed, holding that although the "evidence was sufficient to
confirm the test was administered within two hours of driving based on
the additional evidence received by the hearing officer, . . . the Depart-
ment's failure to forward the first blood collection kit divested it of
jurisdiction to suspend Maher's driver's license." 15 On appeal, the
Department argued that the district court erred in finding that the
officer's failure to forward the first empty kit divested the director of
jurisdiction to suspend Maher's driver's license. 16  Maher cross
appealed, asserting the statement of the officer was inadmissible
hearsay. 17
Section 39-20-03.1(3) of the North Dakota Century Code requires
the officer to "forward to the director . . . a copy of the certified copy
of the analytical report for a blood, saliva, or urine test for all tests
administered at the direction of the officer."1 8 The court examined this
statute in Bosch v. Moore,19 where it concluded that "[t]he legislature
has made it the hearing officer's domain, not the officer's, to judge the
foundational facts for the admissibility of test results and the weight to
be given to each of those results." 20 According to the court in Maher,
analytical reports for a blood test are the "results" referred to in
Bosch.21
In this case, the hearing officer found that no blood had entered the
first vacutainer tube. 22 Therefore, according to the court, it was impossi-
ble to obtain an analytical report of a blood test from a vacutainer tube
with no blood in it.23 Thus, the supreme court concluded that section
39-20-03.1 did not require the officer to send the opened, empty blood
collection kit to the Director of the Department of Transportation.24
In his cross appeal, Maher argued that, absent the officer's state-
ment, the properly admitted evidence was insufficient to establish the
time of his driving. 25 Section 39-20-04.1 of the North Dakota Century
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 302.
17. Maher, 539 N.W.2d at 301.
18. NJ). CENT. CODE § 39-20-03,1(3) (Supp. 1995).
19. 517 N.W.2d 412 (N.D. 1994).
20. Bosch v. Moore, 517 N.W.2d 412,413 (N.D. 1994).
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Code requires the suspension of the driving privileges of an individual
whose blood-alcohol concentration was at least 0.10 percent based on a
test performed within two hours of driving or being in actual physical
control of a vehicle. 26 Maher contends that the officer's statement that
"the time of the stop, according to state radio, was 1:23 a.m.," should
have been excluded as hearsay.27
Admissibility of evidence in an administrative hearing shall be
determined in accordance with the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.
28
Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
29
The court established that the statement of the officer was hearsay under
Rule 801(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.30 However, accord-
ing to the court, an exception to the hearsay rule exists where a "state-
ment describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereaf-
ter."31 Finding that the statement was made contemporaneously with the
stop, the court concluded that the statement was properly admitted into
evidence as a present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.
32
Based upon additional evidence received at the hearing concerning
the time of driving, the court concluded that a reasonable person could
have found that Maher was tested within two hours of the time of driv-
ing. Thus, the supreme court reversed the district court's decision, which
required the officer to submit the initial empty blood collection kit, and
reinstated the hearing officer's decision to suspend Maher's license for
365 days. 33
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-SUSPENSION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE
PETERSON V. DIRECTOR, NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
In Peterson v. Director, North Dakota Department of Transporta-
tion,34 the Department of Transportation appealed a judgment of the
district court, which reversed the Department's suspension of James
Howard Peterson's driver's license. 35 The North Dakota Supreme Court
26. Maher, 539 N.W.2d at 302 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-03.1(3) (Supp. 1995).
27. id. at 303.
28. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-06(1) (1991)).
29. Id.
30. Id; se also N.D. R. EvID. 801(c).
31. Maher, 539 N.W.2d at 303 (quoting N.D. R. EvtD. 803(1)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 536 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1995).
35. Peterson v. Director. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 536 N.W.2d 367, 368 (N.D. 1995).
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reversed the district court and reinstated the decision of the hearing
officer, thereby suspending Peterson's license.
36
Bismarck Police Officer, John McDonald, observed a vehicle travel-
ing north on State Street with its tires "right on" the lane dividers.
37
After the vehicle crossed over the line, Officer McDonald activated his
lights and pulled the vehicle over in a nearby parking lot. 38 When
Officer McDonald approached the vehicle, he noticed an odor of alcohol
coming from inside the vehicle. 39 Suspecting that the driver of the
vehicle, Peterson, was under the influence of alcohol, Officer McDonald
asked Peterson to perform field sobriety tests.40 Peterson failed the field
sobriety tests and was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol.41
Another Bismarck Police officer, Officer James Chase, subsequently
administered an intoxilyzer test to Peterson, which yielded a blood
alcohol content of 0.13%.42 However, when Officer Chase filled out the
testing data, he misidentified the solution which was used on the test.43
Because a discrepancy existed between the solution number on Peter-
son's test and other intoxilyzer tests administered, the hearing officer
subpoenaed Officer Chase to appear at the hearing. 44 At the hearing,
Officer Chase testified that the misidentification resulted from an error in
transcription and that proper solution, Solution 386, was indeed used.4
5
Consequently, the hearing officer concluded that Peterson had been
lawfully arrested and tested, and issued a ninety-one day license suspen-
sion. 46 The district court reversed, finding that the hearing officer had
performed investigatory functions in violation of section 28-32-12.2 of
the North Dakota Century Code, when she subpoenaed and questioned
Officer Chase.47
At the outset, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the
"mere combination of adjudicative and prosecutorial functions in a
Department hearing officer does not, by itself, violate a driver's due





40. Peterson, 536 N.W.2d at 368.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. Officer Chase noted the solution as Solution 382 instead of Solution 386. Id. Both
solutions were approved by the state toxicologist, but Solution 382 was no longer in use. Id.
44. Id.
45. Peterson, 536 N.W.2d at 368.
46. Id. at 369.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Dittus v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 502 N.W.2d 100, 103 (N.D. 1993)).
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Dakota Century Code, the supreme court determined that although the
district court found that the hearing officer violated the section that
stated that "no person who has served as investigator, prosecutor, or
advocate in the investigatory or prehearing stage of a contested case
proceeding may serve as hearing officer, '49 there was no evidence in the
record to indicate that the hearing officer served in any of the capacities
set forth in this section. 50  Rather, the record showed only that the
hearing officer noticed a discrepancy among the numbers listed on
intoxilyzer forms.51
Moreover, the court noted that, under section 28-32-09 of the North
Dakota Century Code,
[a]ny hearing officer may require, upon the request of any
party to the proceedings conducted by the agency, or upon the
agency's or the hearing officer's own motion on behalf of the
agency, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of documents and other objects described in a
subpoena at a hearing or other part of the proceedings. 52
Thus, the court concluded, that under section 28-32-09(2), the
hearing officer has the authority to subpoena the testing officer in order
to clarify a discrepancy in the testing procedure, or any other necessary
explanation .53
Lastly, the court stated that there was no evidence that the hearing
officer had prejudged the issues or acted with partiality in subpoenaing
the officer to testify. 54 Limiting its review to the subpoena issue, the
court held that the subpoena was authorized by statute and reinstated the
hearing officer's decision suspending Peterson's driving privileges. 55
APPEAL AND ERROR -ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING INJUNCTION
MAGRINAT V. TRINITY HosPITAL
In Magrinat v. Trinity Hospital,56 Trinity Hospital (Trinity)
appealed a district court judgment enjoining them from suspending Dr.
Gaston Magrinat while Trinity conducted an investigation of Dr.
Magrinat's alleged misconduct. 57 The North Dakota Supreme Court
49. Id. at 369 (quoting N.D. CEN'. CODE § 28-32-12.2(1) (1991)).
50. Peterson, 536 N.W.2d at 369.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-09(2) (Supp. 1995)).
53. Id. at 369.
54. Id. at 370.
55. Peterson, 536 N.W.2d at 370.
56. 540 N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1995).
57. Magrinat v. Trinity Hosp., 540 N.W.2d 625,626 (N.D. 1995).
768 [VOL. 72:763
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reversed and vacated the injunction, ruling that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting injunctive relief because Magrinat's suspension
was authorized under Trinity's bylaws.
58
On June 17, 1995, a patient arrived at Trinity complaining of chest
pains, and it was soon determined that he was having a heart attack.5
9
The patient's doctor consulted with cardiologist Dr. Magrinat, and both
concluded that a coronary bypass surgery was the best option. However,
before operating, the doctors decided to conduct a balloon angioplasty
procedure to ease the patient's symptoms. 60 Although a backup team
was not available, the doctors decided to proceed with the angioplasty
because it was an emergency. 61 For reasons not mentioned in the record,
the patient's family signed consent documents which required a backup
team to be present, rather than consent documents for an emergency
procedure. 62 When Dr. Magrinat attempted to gather the equipment
needed to conduct the balloon angioplasty, a lab technician at the
hospital refused to open the cabinet containing the supplies, because the
consent documents did not authorize the procedure without surgical
backup. 63 At that point, Dr. Magrinat became upset, and as alleged by
some hospital staff, grabbed a telephone receiver and struck a technician
in the face with it.64 It was further alleged that Dr. Magrinat told the
patient that the hospital employees were going to let him die.65 The
patient then fired Dr. Magrinat and asked for another cardiologist. 66
As a result of the incident, Trinity suspended Dr. Magrinat for four-
teen days while the Executive Committee performed an investigation.67
The Executive Committee then issued an interim suspension, and in-
formed Dr. Magrinat that the suspension would be in force until a full
investigation was completed and possible recommendations were made.68
Dr. Magrinat sought injunctive relief in district court pursuant to section
32-05-04(1) of the North Dakota Century Code,69 which was granted,
58. Id. at 630.
59. Id. at 626.
60. Id. at 627.
61. Id. Trinity policy requires a backup team for a balloon angioplasty unless it is an emergency.
Id.





67. Magrinat, 540 N.W.2d at 627.
68. Id. Dr. Magrinat was informed of the suspension by way of letter which stated that
suspending his practice privileges during the investigation "is in the best interests of patient care at
Trinity Hospital by preventing potential harm to patients." Id.
69. N.D. CE.Nr. CODE § 32-05-04(l) (1976). This section provides that "[e]xcept when otherwise
provided by this chapter, a final injunction may be granted to prevent the breach of an obligation
existing in favor of the applicant ...[w]hen pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate
1996] 769
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and Trinity appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, claiming that
the granting of injunctive relief was an abuse of discretion.70
Dr. Magrinat claimed that if his suspension lasted longer than thirty
days, federal law required Trinity to inform the national practitioner data
bank, which could cause damage to his professional reputation not
compensable by a monetary damage award. 71 Trinity countered this by
arguing that monetary damages would be an adequate remedy if Dr.
Magrinat's name was wrongfully placed in the national practitioner data
bank; further, if the subsequent investigation cleared him of any wrong-
doing, that finding would be reported in the data bank eliminating the
harm to him.72
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the granting or
denying of injunctive relief will only be reversed if there is an abuse of
discretion, and in this case, concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion when it granted injunctive relief in favor of Dr. Magrinat. 73 In
making this determination, the court looked to the written bylaws of the
Trinity Hospital medical staff, which allow the Executive Committee to
impose an interim suspension of a physician's privileges during an
investigation of his conduct if it is in the best interests of patient care. 74
The Executive Committee issued the suspension in the best interests of
patient care, based on information that Dr. Magrinat acted out of anger
on June 17, 1995.75 Furthermore, the Committee had information to
conclude that Dr. Magrinat's actions caused a staff employee physical
injury, and caused emotional upset and physically endangered the heart
attack patient.76
The court further noted that the trial court had issued injunctive
relief based on the four factors used to determine when a court should
issue a preliminary injunction pending a final decision on the merits.
These factors, however, were not applicable because Dr. Magrinat sought
final relief.77 When a party such as Dr. Magrinat seeks final injunctive
relief, the issue under section 32-05-04 of the North Dakota Century
relief." Id.
70. Magrinat, 540 N.W.2d at 627-28. Before getting to the merits of Trinity's argument, the
North Dakota Supreme Court raised the issue of appealability on its own prerogative, and concluded
that this temporary injunction was appealable. Id. at 627.




74. Id. The bylaws also allow a fourteen day suspension similar to the one Dr. Magrinat receiv-
ed. Id.
75. Magrinat, 540 N.W.2d at 628.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 628-29. Those factors are: "(1) substantial probability of succeeding on the merits; (2)
irreparable injury; (3) harm to other interested parties; and (4) effect on the public interest." Id. at
629.
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Code is whether the relief is necessary to prevent the breach of an
obligation that exists in the applicant's favor. Here, Dr. Magrinat could
not demonstrate the need to prevent a breach because, under the bylaws,
Trinity had the right to impose the suspension.78 The court also looked
to public policy, noting that hospitals have a duty to the public to
provide suitable physicians and to investigate complaints about them.79
Although severe, a prehearing suspension of practicing privileges is
acceptable when required by patient safety and allowed by the bylaws.80
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed and the
injunction vacated.81
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW
LAMB V. NORTH DAKOTA BAR BOARD
In Lamb v. North Dakota Bar Board82 Timothy Lamb petitioned
the North Dakota Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the North
Dakota Admission to Practice Rules for review of the North Dakota Bar
Board's negative recommendations on his application for admission to
practice law in the State of North Dakota.83
Timothy Lamb has taken the North Dakota bar examination on
four separate occasions: July 1993, February 1994, July 1994, and Feb-
ruary 1995.84 Each of these examinations required a combined score of
at least 260 on the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) and the North
Dakota essay portions.85 On none of the four examinations did Lamb
attain a passing score for admission to practice.86
Lamb sought review of the Bar Board's negative recommendation
for admission to the Bar arguing, first, that the court should employ a
"heightened" or "intermediate" level of scrutiny and should shift the
burden to the Bar Board because the court is, in effect, reviewing its own
78. Id. at 629.
79. Id.
80. Magrinat, 540 N.W.2d at 629. The court distinguished this case from McMillan v. Anchor-
age Community Hosp., 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982). Id. In McMillan, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled
that a hospital board wrongfully suspended a physician's privileges because there was no showing that
his being unable to get along with other hospital staff members negatively impacted patient care. 646
P.2d at 865-66. In contrast, in the case at bar the Executive Committee had reason to believe that Dr.
Magrinat's conduct put a patient's health in danger. Magrinat, 540 N.W.2d at 629.
81. Id. at 630.
82. 539 N.W.2d 865 (N.D. 1995).
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policy.87 Second, Lamb argued that the Bar Board deprived Lamb of
due process because he did not receive a fair and impartial hearing, and
that the Bar Board denied evidence Lamb requested.88
Noting that the United States Constitution does not create a right to
practice law, 89 the court looks for a "rational connection between a
qualification standard and the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law" when reviewing a negative recommendation by the Bar Board. 90 A
state is free to impose higher qualifications standards for admission to
the bar so long as the qualification has a rational connection to the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.9 1 Finding that the pur-
pose of the bar examination and Bar Board policies was to protect the
public, the North Dakota Supreme Court opined that neither employing
a heightened level of scrutiny or shifting the burden of proof from the
applicant to the Bar Board would serve to advance the purpose of
protecting the public and therefore declined to change the level of
scrutiny for review of Lamb's petition.92
In support of his due process argument, Lamb raised three issues.
First, Lamb claimed that the Bar Board deprived him of due process
because a hearing officer did not preside over Bar Board hearings. 93
Second, Lamb alleged that he was not told at the May 1994 hearing how
the Bar Board derived a passing score, and that the method of determin-
ing a passing score was unreliable. 94 Lastly, Lamb claimed that the Bar
Board failed to define "practice and procedure" as requested by Lamb
at the November 1994 hearing.95
However, according to the supreme court, the due process clause
does not require a full adversarial proceeding. 96 All that is required by
the due process clause is that the Bar Board "employ fair procedures in
processing applications for admission to the bar."97 Finding that Lamb
had reasonable opportunities "to present and examine witnesses, to
present evidence, to respond to evidence presented against his applica-
tions, and to argue his case," the supreme court concluded that the Bar
Board's procedures did not deprive Lamb of his due process rights.98
87. Id. at 867.
88. Lamb, 539 N.W.2d at 867.
89. Id. at 866.
90. Id. at 867.
91. Id. at 866.
92. Id. at 867.




97. Id. (quoting Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474,478 (7th Cir. 1974)).
98. Lamb, 539 N.W.2d at 867.
772 [VOL. 72:763
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Continuing, Lamb argued that he should be certified to practice law
despite the negative recommendations of the Bar Board because the bar
examinations he took were unreliable; Lamb presented evidence that
given the small number of people taking the February bar examination,
the grading of the exams was unreliable. 99 To set aside a bar examina-
tion result, however, the applicant must prove that the Bar Board acted
unreasonably and arbitrarily. 00 In the opinion of the court, Lamb failed
to meet this burden.lOl
Lamb further asserted that "evidence" is not part of "practice and
procedure" as that phrase was used in Question 2 of the July 1994
examination. 102  Quoting from the North Dakota Constitution, the
supreme court stated that the court has the "authority to promulgate
rules of procedure . .. to be followed by all the courts of this state." 103
"This authority includes the promulgation of rules for the receipt and
admission of evidence." 104 Accordingly, the court found that procedure
includes both pleading and evidentiary matters.105 Therefore, the Bar
Board did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in including an evidentiary
issue in a practice and procedure question.106 Lastly, the court stated
that Lamb had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to find that exami-
nation instructions were improperly administered or that the cutoff score
used by the Bar Board lacked an adequate foundation. 10 7 As Lamb did
not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Bar Board acted
arbitrarily or unreasonably, the court accepted the Board's negative
recommendations and denied Lamb's petitions. 08
ATroRNEY AND CLIENT-CONFLICT OF INTEREST
HERINGER v. HASKELL
In Heringer v. Haskell,10 9 Robert Heringer petitioned the North
Dakota Supreme Court for a supervisory writ directing the district court
to disqualify Randall Bakke and the law firm of Smith, Bakke &
99. Id.
100. Id. at 868.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Lamb, 539 N.W.2d at 868 (citing ND. CONST. art. VI, § 3, cl. 1).
104. Id. (quoting City of Fargo v. Ruether, 490 N.W.2d 481,483 (N D. 1992)).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. d. at 868-69.
108. Lamb, 539 N.W.2d at 869.
109. 536 N.W.2d 362 (ND. 1995).
7731996]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Hovland from representing Michael Puklich in litigation against
Heringer."l0
Robert Heringer brought a negligence suit against Puklich, a
certified public accountant, for accounting services and professional
advice which Puklich provided to Heringer regarding the purchase of a
boat dealership.Ill In January of 1992, Heringer consulted with attorney
Kenneth Homer of the Smith, Homer & Bakke firm regarding a possible
lawsuit against Puklich.112 Homer accepted the representation and
opened a file at the firm containing his notes and other materials from
his meeting with Heringer.1 13 These notes included confidential infor-
mation concerning Heringer's claim against Puklich.11 4
Over the course of the next eighteen months, Homer did little work
on Heringer's file, and in August of 1993, attorney Craig Boeckel
contacted Homer regarding Heringer's claim.115 On August 27, 1993,
Homer transferred the contents of his file to Boeckel, and by way of a
cover letter, released any claim that the firm of Smith, Homer & Bakke
had to attorney's fees.'16 Subsequently, Homer left this firm in Decem-
ber, 1993, causing the firm to reorganize under the name of Smith,
Bakke & Hovland.117
When Boeckel contacted Puklich about Heringer's claim, Puklich
hired Bakke to represent him."l8 Upon learning of this, Boeckel advised
Bakke that Homer's former representation of Heringer created a conflict
of interest and requested that Bakke and the Smith firm decline repre-
sentation of Puklich.119 Bakke and the firm refused, and Heringer
motioned the trial court to disqualify them from representing Puklich.120
Despite finding that Homer had in fact represented Heringer in the
same litigation and had received confidential and privileged information,
the trial court ruled that Bakke and the other attorneys in the firm had
not received material information about the file, and denied the
110. Heringer v. Haskell, 536 N.W.2d 362, 364 (N.D. 1995).








119. Id. Homer testified that, during the time between the initial meeting with Heringer and the
transfer of the file to Boeckel, the file would have been either behind his secretary's desk or in the
general file storage room. Id. The other attorneys in the firm had access to the files stored in either
area. Id. In addition, Homer stated that the partners in the firm occasionally discussed their cases
with each other. Id.
120. Heringer, 536 N.W.2d at 364.
774 [VOL. 72:763
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motion. 12 1 Acknowledging that an order to disqualify counsel is not
immediately appealable, Heringer petitioned for a supervisory writ. 122
Finding the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction appropriate, the
North Dakota Supreme Court looked to Rule 1.10(c) of the North
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct concerning imputed disqualifica-
tion of a law firm upon a former member's representation of an adverse
party. 123 It is provided that:
When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the
firm may not thereafter knowingly represent a person when:
(1) The person has interests materially adverse to those of
a non-governmental client represented by the formerly
associated lawyer;
(2) The matter is the same or is substantially related to
that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented
the client; and
(3) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has material infor-
mation protected by Rule 1.6 [confidential information]. 124
According to the supreme court, "[d]isqualification under Rule
1.10 requires a three-step analysis: (1) Are the new client's interests
materially adverse to the old client's interests? (2) Is the matter the same
or substantially related to the prior representation? (3) Does any lawyer
remaining in the firm have material information?" 125 The supreme
court found that, under the facts of the case, the first two requirements
for disqualification were satisfied. 126 For the court, the critical issue was
whether Bakke or other lawyers in the Smith firm had access to
confidential material information.127
Looking to the comment to Rule 1.10 and cases interpreting the
rule, the court concluded that access to confidential information was the
deciding factor. 128 Therefore, the firm opposing disqualification must
also show that no attorney remaining in the firm had access to the
confidential information. 129 Affidavits asserting that the remaining




124. ND. R. PRop. CoNDucr 1.10(c).
125. Heringer, 536 N.W.2d at 365.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 365-66 (citations omitted).
129. id. at 365.
1996] 775
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to prevent disqualification.130 According to the court, "such access
equates with knowledge of the client's confidential information."
131
Thus, to "preserve public confidence in the legal profession, and to
insure the confidentiality and integrity of client information .... firm[s]
must not be allowed to 'switch sides' when attorneys remaining in the
firm had access to the former client's file." 132
In this case, it was conceded that Heringer's confidential file was
generally accessible to Bakke for the nineteen months Homer represent-
ed Heringer; and further, it was the practice of attorney's in the firm to
discuss pending cases. 133 Finding that, "[u]nder [the] circumstances, it
[was] reasonable and justified to infer that each attorney had access to,
and therefore knowledge of, all confidential information of the firm's
clients," the supreme court directed the disqualification of Bakke and
the law firm of Smith, Bakke & Hovland.134
BREACH OF PEACE -DISORDERLY CONDUCT RESTRAINING ORDER
WILLIAMS V. SPILOVOY
In Williams v. Spilovoy,13 5 Richard Spilovoy (Richard), ex-husband
of Beverly Spilovoy Williams (Beverly), appealed the trial court's
decision to issue a restraining order against him,which prevented him
from contacting his ex-wife. 136 The North Dakota Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice VandeWalle, reversed the trial court's issuance
of the restraining order.137
On April 27, 1994, Beverly filed a petition in district court seeking a
restraining order against Richard.138 After conducting a hearing on the
matter, the trial court entered a disorderly conduct restraining order
against Richard "prohibiting oral or written communication between the
parties, prohibiting them from coming within twenty-five feet of each
other, and prohibiting them from being on each other's property except
when exchanging the children for visitation." 139 In support of the
restraining order, the trial court found that Richard had made calls to
Beverly which were "harassing in nature[,]" that Beverly was "fearful
130. Heringer, 536 N.W.2d at 365.
131. Id. at 366.
132. Id. at 367.
133. Id. at 366.
134. Id. at 367.
135. 536 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1995).
136. Williams v. Spilovoy, 536 N.W.2d 383,384 (N.D. 1995).
137, Id. at 385.
138, Id. at 384.
139. Id.
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of close contact with [Richard,]" and that Richard had utilized the
children and episodes of visitation to harass Beverly. 40
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court, on review of the hear-
ing transcript, was unable to find evidence to support the findings of the
trial court.1 41 Rather, the court found that the evidence revealed only
vague and general allegations of harassment. 14 2  Under section
12.1-31.2-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, a trial court may issue
a "no-contact" order if it finds reasonable grounds to believe a party
has engaged in disorderly conduct. 143 "Reasonable grounds" to believe
disorderly conduct has been committed is synonymous with "probable
cause." 144 According to the court, "reasonable grounds exist for
purposes of this section when facts and circumstances presented to the
judge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
that acts constituting the offense of disorderly conduct have been
committed."145 Thus, to support a disorderly-conduct restraining order
under section 12.1-31.2-01, the petitioning party must introduce
evidence of specific acts or threats constituting disorderly conduct. 146
Addressing each of the trial court findings separately, the court
found that the telephone calls, which Beverly emphasized as harassing,
revealed no language or actions by Richard rising to the level of disor-
derly conduct under the statute. 147 Further, the transcript was void of
any evidence that Richard made harassing telephone calls or that these
calls "otherwise interfered with her 'safety, security, or privacy.'148 In
addition, the court was unable to find evidence of specific instances when
Richard had "utilized the children and episodes of visitation for harass-
ment" of Beverly. 149 Lastly, the court opined that Beverly's subjective
fear itself was insufficient to support the restraining order absent evi-
dence of specific instances of actions or threats on Richard's part which
constituted disorderly conduct or were the basis for Beverly's fear. 150
In conclusion, the court cautioned that the opinion should not be
read to place unreasonable barriers upon parties seeking restraining
140. Id.
141. Spilovoy, 536 N.W.2d at 384.
142. Id.
143. Id. Disorderly conduct" means "intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are in-
tended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another person." N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-31.2-01(1) (Supp. 1995).
144. Spilovoy, 536 N.W.2d at 384 (citing Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 681-82 (N.D.
1994)).
145. Id. (quoting Svedberg, 525 N.W.2d at 682).
146. Id. at 384.
147. Id. at 385.
148. Id.
149. Spilovoy, 536 N.W.2d at 385.
150. Id.
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orders under the statute. 151 The court noted that in situations where
there is split custody of the children, a certain amount of contact must be
expected.1 52 To justify the restrictions placed upon a party by a
no-contact restraining order, the party seeking the order must present
more than vague, conclusory statements of disorderly conduct. 153 The
court concluded that the statute requires a showing of specific acts or
threats constituting disorderly conduct as a prerequisite to attaining a
disorderly conduct restraining order.' 5 4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
CITY OF FARGO V. BRENNAN
In City of Fargo v. Brennan, 155 Brennan appealed his conviction of
disorderly conduct for invading the zone of privacy of an assistant
administrator of the Fargo Women's Health Organization.1 56 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that
Brennan's conduct of invading the victim's zone of privacy while
waving his arms in an angry manner, is not protected speech.157
Susan Charon, an assistant administrator at the Fargo Women's
Health Organization, was getting into her car when she noticed Brennan
(whom she recognized as a frequent protester at the clinic) approaching
on his bike.158 As Charon was getting into her car, Brennan got within
five feet of her and started screaming and flailing his arms. 159 However,
Brennan did not touch Charon or her car, swing at her, or threaten
her.160
Charon complained to the City of Fargo, and the city charged
Brennan with disorderly conduct, in violation of a Fargo city ordi-




154. Spilovoy, 536 N.W.2d at 385.
155. 543 N.W.2d 240 (N.D. 1996).
156. City of Fargo v. Brennan, 543 N.W.2d 240, 241 (N.D. 1996).
157. Id. at 245.
158. Id. at 241. The Fargo Women's Health Organization is a clinic that performs abortions, and
is often targeted by protest groups. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Charon testified to this at trial. Id. Nonetheless, Charon was still in fear of bodily harm
and became "scared to death" based on Brennan's behavior at prior protests in front of the clinic. Id.
at 241-42. Charon was shaky and upset for the rest of the day. Id.
161. Brennan, 543 N.W.2d at 242. The disorderly conduct ordinance provides in pertinent part
that:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another
person or in reckless disregard of the fact that another person is harassed, annoyed, or
alarmed by his behavior, he:
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without probable cause, and [that] the ordinance did not constitutionally
prohibit his conduct.162 The trial court found that the ordinance was not
facially unconstitutional, but stated there were not enough facts to
determine if it was unconstitutional as applied.163 A bench trial was
conducted, and the trial court concluded that the confrontation was
within Charon's zone of privacy and Brennan's waiving of his hands
constituted an implied threat and was physically offensive.1 64 The trial
court convicted Brennan of disorderly conduct, and he appealed. In his
appeal, Brennan argued that there was not enough evidence to support
his conviction 165 because the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied,
due to the fact that his conduct "was not lewd or obscene" and did not
involve "fighting words."166
On appeal, the city acknowledged that Brennan's expressions war-
ranted First Amendment protection, but his expressions were coupled
with physically offensive conduct, and that the physically offensive
conduct did not have a legitimate political purpose and therefore was not
protected.167 Brennan, on the other hand, claimed his physical actions
"had a legitimate and constitutionally protected purpose of communica-
ting his political message."168 The North Dakota Supreme Court ruled
that Brennan's verbal expressions had a legitimate purpose and were
protected, but the manner in which he delivered the message was not
protected.169 The court concluded that to protect public order, a city can
prohibit alarming behavior that people find threatening, and Brennan's
conduct was physically intimidating and alarmed Charon.170
The court further reasoned that a rational degree of physical separ-
ation can be imposed on a public forum such as a street.1 7 1 This
.... 8. Creates a hazardous, physically offensive, or seriously alarming condition by any
act which serves no legitimate purpose.
FAROO MUN. CODE § 10-0301 (1992).
162. Brennan, 543 N.W.2d at 242. Brennan originally moved to dismiss on the basis that the
ordinance was facially unconstitutional for vagueness and overbreadth, that the complaint stated no
violation of law, and that it was not a crime to hurt another's feelings. Id. The trial court denied the
dismissal, and after Brennan changed attorneys, he brought the above amended motion to dismiss. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 242-43.
165. Id. at 243. The North Dakota Supreme Court reviews sufficiency of the evidence claims
for criminal convictions in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id.
166. Id. Brennan was sentenced to thirty days in jail, and all but five days were suspended for
one year of unsupervised probation, provided that he stay at least ten feet away from Charon. Id.
167. Brennan, 543 N.W. 2d at 243-44.
168. Id. at 244. Brennan further claimed that he moved his arms in order to emphasize a point
and that the movement of his arms was intertwined with his speech. Id. at 243.
169. Id. at 244.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 244.
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conclusion is reflected in Madsen v. Women's Health Center Inc., 1 7 2
where the United States Supreme Court upheld injunctions that limited
protest activities on public roads.173 Under Madsen, injunctions are to
be scruti-nized more closely than city ordinances which reflect a legisla-
tive choice to promote a particular social interest. 174 The First Amend-
ment protects a person's right to offer "sidewalk counseling" to those
that pass by, but it does not allow a protester to physically intimidate
someone on a public street. 175
In this case, Brennan's conduct of screaming at Charon while
waving his arms and invading her "personal zone" by getting within
five feet of her were physically offensive and threatening, and therefore
supported a conviction under Fargo's disorderly conduct ordinance. 176
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.177
CRIMINAL LAW- ADMINISTRATION OF MIRANDA WARNINGS -INTOXILYZER
TEST
STATE V. CHIHANSKI
In State v. Chihanski,178 Joanne Chihanski appealed her guilty
conviction in district court on the charge of driving under the influence
of alcohol.179
On September 17, 1994, at approximately 12:23 a.m., Officer Grant
Schiller arrested Chihanski for driving under the influence of alcohol.180
Schiller did not administer the Miranda'8l warnings to Chihanski at the
time of arrest. 182 Chihanski was handcuffed behind her back and placed
in Schiller's patrol car. 183 When Schiller placed Chihanski in the patrol
car, he checked her mouth and determined that she did not have
172. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
173. Brennan, 543 N.W.2d at 244 (citing Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516,
2526 (1994). The "State ... has a strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order, in promoting
the free flow of traffic on public streets and sidewalks, and in protecting the property rights of all its
citizens." Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526. The Court in Madsen upheld the constitutionality of an
injunction prohibiting abortion protesters from a 36-foot buffer zone located on a public street outside
an abortion clinic, but invalidated many restraints that prohibited protesting within 300 feet of the clinic
and its staff because the restraints were not sufficiently tailored to warrant the restriction of the
protesters' First Amendment freedom. Id.
174. Brennan, 543 N.W.2d at 244 (quoting Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524).
175. Id. (citing Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2533).
176. Id. at 245.
177. Id.
178. 540 N.W.2d 621 (ND. 1995).
179. State v. Chihanski, 540 N.W.2d 621,622 (ND. 1995).
180. Id. at 623.
181. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444-445 (1966) (setting out procedural safeguards to
secure privilege against self incrimination).
182. Chihanski, 540 N.W.2d at 623.
183. Id.
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anything in her mouth.18 4 Chihanski was then transported to the Grand
Forks Police Department. 185 After arriving at the police department,
Schiller checked his weapon while Chihanski remained in his patrol
car. 186 Within moments, Schiller returned to his patrol car and took
Chihanski into the booking room.187 There, Schiller read to Chihanski
the implied consent advisory, then he asked her to take an Intoxilyzer
test to which she agreed.188
Sergeant Robert Johnson administered the Intoxilyzer test after
determining that twenty minutes had passed by asking Schiller the time
of arrest and comparing it to the time on the Intoxilyzer machine.189
Johnson himself did not observe Chihanski for twenty minutes prior to
administering the test. 190 He did ask Chihanski if she had put anything
in her mouth, to which she answered "no." 191
On appeal, Chihanski raised two issues. 192 First, Chihanski contends
that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress the
statement "no," made in response to a police officer's question "have
you put anything in your mouth since the time of arrest" prior to taking
an Intoxilyzer test, because it was testimonial, thus requiring Miranda
warnings. 193 Secondly, Chihanski argued that the Intoxilyzer test was
improperly administered because the testing operator did not observe
Chihanski for twenty minutes prior to administering the test. 194 The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, concluding that
the admission of the statement was harmless error even if it was testimo-
nial requiring Miranda warnings, and that the Intoxilyzer test was fairly
administered.195
The supreme court began by recognizing that the Miranda warn-
ings are required only when a defendant is in custody and is being
interrogated.196 Furthermore, even if these elements are present, the evi-
dence elicited must be testimonial. 197 Quoting the standard set forth by









192. Chihanski, 540 N.W.2d at 622.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 622.
196. Id. at 623.
197. Chihanski, 540 N.W.2d at 623.
198. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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Dakota Supreme Court found that "federal constitutional errors do not
automatically require reversal if it is shown that they were harmless." 199
However, before a constitutional error can be found harmless, the "court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." 200 This belief is satisfied if the court is convinced the error did
not contribute to the verdict. 20 1
Reviewing the entire record, the supreme court found that substan-
tial evidence existed, without Chihanski's statement, to support the deter-
mination of both Schiller and Johnson that Chihanski had not eaten,
drunk, or smoked anything for twenty minutes before taking the Intoxi-
lyzer test.202 Convinced that admission of the statement did not contrib-
ute to the guilty verdict, the court concluded that, even if the statement
was testimonial, admitting it in the absence of Miranda warnings was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.203
In addressing the second issue raised by Chihanski, the supreme
court recognized that "[flair administration of an Intoxilyzer test
requires scrupulously following the approved method for conducting the
test." 204 However, according to the court, scrupulous does not mean
hypertechnical. 205 Finding that Chihanski placed undue emphasis on the
language from Bickler v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner,206
which required the officer to "maintain observation" of the subject, the
court determined the operative language from that case was that "the
operator must ascertain that the subject has had nothing to eat, drink, or
smoke within twenty minutes prior to the collection of the breath sam-
ple." 207  According to the court, "'observing' is not the exclusive
manner of 'ascertaining."' 208 Distinguishing Bickler, the Supreme
Court found that Johnson did ascertain the lapse of twenty minutes
before administering the test by asking Schiller the time of arrest and
independently noting the current time.209 Further, Johnson verified that
199. Chihanski, 540 N.W.2d at 623 (quoting State v. Flamm, 351 N.W.2d 108, 110 (N D. 1984)).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 624. The court found that Chihanski remained in Schiller's presence at all times since
her arrest except for the time Schiller was checking his weapon, that Chihanski remained handcuffed
at all times, including the testing process, that Schiller checked her mouth at the time of arrest, that
Johnson independently noted twenty minutes had passed, and that the pre-testing determination made
by Schiller and Johnson would have been unaffected even if Chihanski had been informed of her
Miranda rights. Id.
203. Id.
204. Chihanski, 540 N.W.2d at 624.
205. Id.
206. 423 N.W.2d 146 (N.D. 1988).
207. Chihanski, 540 N.W.2d at 624. (citing Approved Method to Conduct Breath Test with
Intoxilyzer, Office of State Toxicologist, Apr. 29, 1994) (emphasis by the court).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 625.
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Chihanski could not have eaten, drunk, or smoked anything during the
crucial time period prior to taking the test because she was handcuffed
throughout the entire process.2 10 Thus, the North Dakota Supreme
Court concluded that the Intoxilyzer test was fairly administered to
Chihanski. 21
1
CRIMINAL LAW-ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION
STATE V. BJORNSON
In State v. Bjornson,2 12 the State appealed from a county court
order suppressing a statement made by Bjornson during law
enforcement questioning. 213 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
the suppression of the statement, finding that there was "insufficient
competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's finding
of involuntariness."214
On March 24, 1994, Chief Deputy Sheriff Jim Thoreson asked
Bjornson, a twenty-year veteran of the Cass County Sheriff's Department
to come to the sheriff's office. 215 When Bjornson arrived, he was
escorted into an adjacent office where Thoreson and Lieutenant Mike
Argall confronted him with an allegation that he had indecently exposed
himself to a female employee at a local business. 2 16 At no time was
Bjornson informed that he was a suspect, nor was he advised of his
Miranda rights. 217 Furthermore, Bjornson was not in custody and was
free to leave at any point during the interview.218
The entire interview lasted approximately two hours.219 During the
interview, Thoreson told Bjornson "that if he were not honest with
[Thoreson] and den[ied] involvement that it was [Thoreson's] intention
to utilize the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal Investigation to provide
an agent to do a follow-up investigation and refer the matter to the
State's Attorney's office for criminal prosecution." 220 Shortly there-
after, Bjornson admitted that he had indecently exposed himself. 221
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. 531 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 1995).
213. State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 316 (N.D. 1995).
214. Id. at 316.
215. Id. at 317.
216. Id.
217. Id. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966) (setting out procedural safe-
guards to secure privilege against self incrimination).
218. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d at 319.
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Following the interview, Thoreson and Argall filed written reports
describing the interview.222 These reports were ultimately received into
evidence at the suppression hearing. 223
The trial court found that Thoreson's statement to Bjornson was an
"implicit threat to prosecute Bjornson if he did not confess, and a
promise not to prosecute if he did confess," in violation of section
29-21-12.1 of the North Dakota Century Code.224 According to section
29-21-12.1, "'[a]ny statement, admission, or confession procured from
any person charged with a crime in a state court, which was obtained by
duress, fraud, threat, or promises' [i]s inadmissible as evidence against
the person in a criminal action." 225 In addition, the trial court found
that Bjornson's statement was involuntarily given.226
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that Bjornson
failed to show that his confession was obtained or induced by
Thoreson's statement. 227 The court stated that in order to show that the
statement was induced or obtained as a result of a threat, promise, duress,
or fraud, Bjornson must establish a "'connection or nexus' between the
alleged threat or promise and the statement he seeks to suppress."228
The court concluded that Bjornson failed to show that anyone promised
not to prosecute him, or that even if he believed such a promise were
made, he confessed because of it.229
Moreover, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that since
Bjornson's statement was not involuntary, there was no due process
violation. 230 "When a confession is challenged on due process grounds,
the ultimate question is whether the defendant's confession was volun-
tary."231 "A confession is voluntary if it is the product of the defen-
dant's free choice, rather than the product of coercion." 232 The
voluntariness of a confession is determined by examining the totality of
the circumstances under which the confession was given. 233
222. Id.
223. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d at 317.
224. Id.
225. Id. (quoting ND. CENT. CODE § 29-21-12.1 (1991)). Under section 29-21-12.1, Bjornson
carried the burden of showing that "his statement was induced or obtained as a result of a threat,
promise, duress, or fraud." Id. Section 29-21-12.1 was repealed in 1995. Id. at 317 n.6. See also
ND. CENT. CODE § 29-21-12.1 (Supp. 1995).
226. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d at 318.
227. Id. at 317-18.
228. Id. at 317.
229. Id. at 318.
230. Id. at 319.
231. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d at 319 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)).
232. Id. at 318 (quoting State v. Pickar, 453 N.W.2d 783, 785 (ND. 1990).
233. Id. The court focused on two primary factors under this analysis. Id. First, the court looked
at "the characteristics and condition of the accused at the time of the confession." Id. In addition,
"the details of the setting in which the confession was obtained" were examined. Id.
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Examining the record of the confession, the supreme court noted
that there was no finding that Bjornson was suffering from a physical or
mental condition which would make him susceptible to coercive
tactics. 234 Nor was there evidence that he was deprived of food or sleep,
or subjected to other coercive interrogation tactics.235 The court found
no evidence showing that Bjornson's will was overborne by Thoreson's
questioning.236 Further, an implied threat of prosecution or promise of
leniency, according to the court, is insufficiently coercive to render a
confession involuntary.237
CRIMINAL LAW -DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CTY OF FARGO V. HECTOR
In City of Fargo v. Hector,238 Hector appealed his conviction for
driving under the influence, based on the trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury on double jeopardy. 239 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, concluding that relying on the offense of
exhibition driving to establish a conviction for driving under the
influence does not violate double jeopardy.240
On March 21, 1994, Fargo police officers pulled Hector over after
he squealed his tires as he pulled into the street.241 While charging him
with exhibition driving, the officers noticed that Hector had slurred
speech, bloodshot eyes, and smelled of alcohol. 242 He was given a series
of field sobriety tests, and was subsequently arrested.2 43 Hector was
found guilty of exhibition driving in municipal court and charged with
driving under the influence in county court. 244
At his trial for driving under the influence, Hector claimed that the
offense of exhibition driving was being used to show that he was driving
under the influence. 245 Therefore, Hector proposed a double jeopardy
verdict form at the close of trial. 246 However, the form was refused
234. Id. Bjornson had twenty years of experience in law enforcement and a criminal justice
degree from North Dakota State University.
235. Id. at 319.
236. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d at 319.
237. Id.
238. 534 N.W.2d 821 (N.D. 1995).
239. City of Fargo v. Hector, 534 N.W.2d 821, 822 (N.D. 1995).
240. Id. at 824-25.
241. Id. at 822.
242. Id.
243. Id. The opinion does not say what tests Hector performed or how many he passed and
failed. Id. Further, Hector was offered the opportunity to take a blood-alcohol test, but refused. Id.
244. Hector, 534 N.W.2d at 822.
245. Id.
246. Id. Hector's form was based on Rule 31(e)(2) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal
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because the trial court ruled as a matter of law, that double jeopardy does
not apply, and a special verdict form is required only if it is a question of
fact. 247 Thereafter, the jury convicted Hector for driving under the
influence. 248 Hector then moved for a new trial based on the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury on double jeopardy and the denial of
a special verdict form. 249 The trial court denied the motion, and Hector
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.250
Hector claimed on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in
relying on his exhibition driving offense to establish driving under the
influence and consequently violated double jeopardy. 251 Specifically, he
argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on double
jeopardy, by refusing to submit a special verdict form, and by ruling as a
matter of law, that double jeopardy did not apply.25
2
Hector argued that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to instruct
the jury on double jeopardy. 253 In rejecting Hector's argument, the
North Dakota Supreme Court noted that a written jury instruction was
not submitted by Hector. 254 Because it is up to counsel, not the trial
court, to draft and submit such special instructions, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to give the instruction. 255
Hector's second argument was that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by refusing to submit the special verdict from.256 The North Dakota
Supreme Court disagreed, relying on the explanatory note following
Rule 31 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.257 Rule 31
requires the submission of a special verdict form only if double jeopardy
is a question of fact, and since the trial court ruled as a matter of law that
double jeopardy did not apply, there was no abuse of discretion. 258
Procedure. It is provided that "[wihenever the defendant interposes the defense that he has been
former-ly convicted or acquitted of the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein, or
once in jeopardy, and evidence thereof is given at the trial, the jury, if it so finds, shall declare that
fact in its verdict." N.D. R. CRIM. P. 31(e)(2). The rule allows evidence to be presented on double
jeopardy and, if it is a fact question, the jury may be requested to make a declaration on it. Hector,
534 N.W.2d at 823.
247. Hector, 534 N.W.2d at 823.
248. Id. at 822.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 823.
252. Hector, 534 N.W.2d at 822.




257. Hector, 534 N.W.2d at 823. The explanatory note following Rule 31 states that "[a] deter-
mination of factual issues in the specific instances provided in this subdivision is deemed to be within
the province of the jury. Because it is the court that determines the issue of law, the scope of the jury
is not exceeded." Id. (quoting N.D. R. CRim. P. 31, Explanatory Note).
258. Id.
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Hector also argued on appeal that double jeopardy was violated
because his offense of exhibition driving was used to establish an ele-
ment of his conviction for driving under the influence.259 Noting that
the interpretation of the North Dakota Constitution's Double Jeopardy
Clause is the same as the United States Constitution's Double Jeopardy
Clause, the North Dakota Supreme Court looked to recent case law from
the United States Supreme Court to conclude that there was no double
jeopardy violation. 260 The court relied heavily on United States v.
Dixon,261 in which the United States Supreme Court used the "same
elements" test, sometimes referred to as the "Blockburger"262 test, which
examines "whether each offense contains an element not contained in
the other; if not, they are the 'same offence' (sic) and double jeopardy
bars additional punishment and successive prosecution." 263 The North
Dakota Supreme Court noted that Dixon overruled Grady v. Corbin,264
thus it followed that all North Dakota Supreme Court cases which relied
on Grady were also overruled. 265 The North Dakota Supreme Court
then applied the Blockburger test, comparing the offense of exhibition
driving to the offense of driving under the influence.266 The court noted
that "[e]ach offense contains an element not contained in the other." 2 67
The criminal offense of driving under the influence and the
non-criminal offense of exhibition driving have different requirements,
and therefore using the offense of exhibition driving to establish driving
under the influence did not violate double jeopardy. 268
259. Id.
260. Id. at 823-25.
261. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
262. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (setting out that to determine
whether there are two offenses arising from the same conduct is to ascertain "whether each provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not").
263. Hector, 534 N.W.2d at 823 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993)).
264. 495 U.S. 508 (1990). In Grady, the Supreme Court held the state barred by double jeopardy
from prosecuting homicide and assault charges based entirely on conduct on which the defendant had
been previously convicted of misdemeanors. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508,523 (1990).
265. Hector, 534 N.W.2d at 823-24.
266. Id. at 824.
267. Id. The Fargo Municipal Code prohibits exhibition driving by providing that:
"Exhibition driving" means driving a vehicle in such a manner that it creates or causes
unnecessary engine noise, tire squeal, skid or slide upon acceleration, braking or
stopping; or that causes the vehicle to unnecessarily turn abruptly or sway; or driving and
executing or attempting one or a series of unnecessarily abrupt turns.
Id. (quoting FARGO MUN. CODE § 8-0317(B)(2) (1992)). The provision that prohibits driving under
the influence states that "[n]o person shall drive, or be in actual physical control of, any vehicle upon
any street, highway, public or private parking lot, or other public or private property in this city if said
person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or controlled substances." Id. (quoting FARGO MUN.
CODE § 8-0310 (1994)).
268. Id. Hector also raised the "same evidence" argument, claiming that some of the evidence
used in the prosecution for exhibition driving was also used in his trial for driving under the influence.
Id. The court rejected his argument, noting that the Supreme Court in Grady rejected the same
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Meschke claimed that the majority
only "attempted burial" of the Grady "same conduct" doctrine. 269 In
concluding that double jeopardy was not violated, Justice Meschke
simply pointed out that a "criminal penalty after a civil assessment for
the same conduct does not create double jeopardy." 270 According to
Justice Meschke, the later criminal prosecution for driving under the
influence did not violate double jeopardy, because the exhibition driving
assessment was in a civil case.271
CRIMINAL LAW- INVESTIGATORY STOP
STATE v. HAWLEY
In State v. Hawley 272 Jacqueline Hawley appealed from the district
court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence and from her convic-
tion for actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol. 273
On December 29, 1994, North Dakota Highway Patrol Trooper
Lonny Hulm came upon Hawley's Pickup truck parked on the east-
bound off-ramp of Exit 134 on Interstate 94 with its engine running and
lights off.274 Although there was room for cars to go around the truck,
Hulm testified that Hawley's vehicle was blocking part of the
off-ramp. 275 Hulm pulled up behind the truck, checked the license
number by radio, and turned on the patrol car's overhead lights. 276
Hulm approached the vehicle and asked Hawley if "everything was
okay."277 When Hawley responded, Hulm noticed an odor of alco-
hol.278 After further investigation, Hawley was arrested for actual
physical control of a motor vehicle.279
At trial, Hawley moved to suppress the evidence, alleging that Hulm
did not have "a reasonable and articulable suspicion for making the
stop." 280 The trial court denied the motion, concluding that a Fourth
Amendment seizure did not occur until Hulm smelled the odor of
evidence test, so separate offenses may be proved by using the same evidence. Id.
269. Id. at 825 (Meschke, J., concurring). Justice Meschke asserted that the majority's approach
was inadequate because there will be many instances where the same traffic conduct will result in
multiple prosecutions, for example when an intoxicated driver kills someone. Id.
270. Hector, 534 N.W.2d at 825.
271. Id.
272. 540 N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 1995).
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alcohol. 281 In addition, the court found that Hulm was on a "communi-
ty caretaking function" when he approached the vehicle on foot.282
Hawley entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving her right to appeal
the denial of suppression.283
In State v. Halfinann,28 4 the North Dakota Supreme Court estab-
lished three distinct levels of law enforcement-citizen encounters. 28 5 The
first level, arrests, require probable cause.286 Next are "Terry" stops
which must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of
criminal activity when the law enforcement officer lacks probable
cause. 28 7 The last level, community caretaking encounters do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment. 288
On appeal, Hawley asserted that Hulm not only lacked a reasonable
and articulable suspicion to make the stop, but also, there was no "indi-
cia of distress" justifying a community caretaking encounter. 28 9 Find-
ing that Hulm had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a parking
violation, the supreme court bypassed Hawley's second argument and
affirmed her conviction for actual physical control. 290
To justify an investigatory stop, an officer must have a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that a law has been, or is being, violated.291
This standard requires more than a "mere hunch," but less than "prob-
able cause." 292 Here, the court noted that Hulm admittedly had not
formed any suspicions of criminal activity at the site of the parked
vehicle, but rather believed he was performing a caretaking function. 293
Nonetheless, the court emphasized that the reasonable and articulable
standard is an objective one and "does not hinge upon the subjective
beliefs of the arresting officer."294
Under this objective standard, the court may find a reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, despite the investigating offi-
cer's own beliefs, "if there was an 'objective manifestation' to lead a
reasonable person in Hulm's position to believe that a traffic violation
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d at 391.
284. 518 N.W.2d 729,730 (N.D. 1994).
285. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d at 392. (citing State v. Halfmann. 518 N.W.2d 729,730 (N.D. 1994)).
286. Id. (citing Halfimann, 518 N.W.2d at 730).
287. Id. (citing Halfmann, 518 N.W.2d at 730).
288. Id. (citing Halfinann, 518 N.W.2d at 730).
289. Id.
290. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d at 392.
291. Id.
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may be taking place." 29 5 The court stated that all traffic violations, no
matter how minor, meet the required suspicion for an investigative
stop.2 9 6 Accordingly, the supreme court found that Hawley's truck,
which was partially blocking the off-ramp with its lights off, was a
sufficient objective manifestation leading a reasonable person to suspect
that it was illegally parked.297 Thus, the court concluded that a reason-
able and articulable suspicion justified Hulm's investigation.
298
CRIMINAL LAW-INVESTIGATORY STOP
BoRowicz v. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
In Borowicz v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,299 Bor-
owicz appealed a district court ruling affirming the suspension of his
drivers license for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI).300 The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the ruling, concluding that the
arresting officer had reasonable grounds to investigate a parked truck on
a public road in which the driver was asleep behind the wheel.301
On June 3, 1994, a Grand Forks Police Officer approached
Borowicz's truck, which was parked on a public road, and knocked on
the driver's window. 302 When Borowicz did not respond, the officer
knocked louder with his flashlight until Borowicz woke up. 303 After
Borowicz woke up, the officer asked him to open the door, and noticed
that the truck was not running, but that the keys were in the ignition. 304
Thereafter, the officer detected the odor of alcohol emitting from
Borowicz and as a consequence, asked him to perform field sobriety
tests, of which Borowicz failed four out of five. 305 Borowicz was
subsequently arrested for being in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of section 39-08:01 of
the North Dakota Century Code.306 At the police station, a breathalyzer




299. 529 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1995).
300. Borowicz v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 529 N.W.2d 186, 186-87 (N.D. 1995).




305. Borowicz, 529 N.W.2d at 187. Borowicz properly counted backwards from one hundred,
but failed the walk-and-turn, one-leg stand, alphabet, and finger-dexterity tests. Id.
306. Id. The statute provides:
1. A person may not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a
highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for
vehicular use in this state if any of the following apply:
a. That person has an alcohol concentration of at least ten one-hundredths
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test revealed Borowicz's blood alcohol concentration to be 0.13%.307 At
an administrative hearing before the Department of Transportation, the
hearing officer concluded that the investigation and subsequent arrest by
the officer was proper and suspended Borowicz's license for one year.
308
Borowicz appealed the ruling to the district court, which affirmed the
administrative hearing officer's ruling.309 Borowicz then appealed to the
North Dakota Supreme Court.310
On appeal, Borowicz claimed that the investigatory stop made by
the arresting officer was improper because it was not done within the
domain of a police officer's "community caretaker function . . . and
that the officer had no reasonable, articulable suspicion that Borowicz
committed or was committing a crime" when he approached the
truck. 311
The North Dakota Supreme Court refused to determine whether the
officer's actions amounted to a stop.312 Instead, the court noted that if a
stop did in fact occur, any Fourth Amendment privacy interest that
Borowicz claimed was outweighed by the officer's reasonable suspicions
of actual physical control and the important public interest in preventing
DUI offenses. 313 The court found that since the truck was already
parked when the officer noticed it, the only "stop" that may have
occurred was when Borowicz was asked to open the door and provide his
driver's license. 314 However, by this time, the officer had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of actual physical control, based on the fact that
Borowicz was behind the wheel with the keys in the ignition, to justify
the "stop."' 3 15 Because the officer had reasonable grounds to investi-
gate the parked truck, and following the investigation, had reasonable
grounds to conclude that Borowicz was in actual physical control of the
truck, the suspension of Borowicz's license was affirmed. 316
of one percent by weight at the time of the performance of a chemical test
within two hours after the driving or being in actual physical control of a
vehicle.
b. That person is under the influence of an intoxicating liquor.
N.D. CET. CODE § 39-08-01(1) (Supp. 1995).





312. Borowicz, 529 N.W.2d at 188. The court did note, however, that the facts were similar to
those in State v. Franklin, 524 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1994), where the court ruled that a stop did not
occur. Id.
313. Id. at 188.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 188-89.
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CRIMNAL LAW-JURY
STATE V. MARSHALL
In State v. Marshall,317 Floyd Solomon Marshall appealed from his
jury conviction of accomplice to burglary, under sections 12.1-22-02
and 12.1-03-01 of the North Dakota Century Code.318
On the morning of November 7, 1993, Officer McDonald of the
North Dakota State University Police Department observed a car with its
lights off in the parking lot of a local restaurant. 319 Patrolling the street
a while later, Officer McDonald again noticed the car in the lot, but this
time observed a person, who was later identified as Marshall, in it.320 He
also observed another person, Todd Edmond Cody, outside the car near
the drive-up window of the restaurant. 321 Officer McDonald stopped the
car as it began to leave the parking lot with its headlights off, and
radioed for assistance. 322 While investigating the area, Officer McDonald
found the drive-up window of the restaurant ajar. 323 In addition, other
officers found pry bars, gloves, and cash in Marshall's car. 324 Based on
this evidence, police arrested Marshall and Cody for burglary. 325
Cody pled guilty to burglary and agreed to testify against Marshall
in return for a deferred sentence.326 Marshall, charged under sections
12.1-22-02 and 12.1-03-01 as an accomplice to burglary, entered a plea
of innocent. 327 At trial, Cody testified that on the evening of the arrest,
Marshall had been teaching Cody how to burglarize businesses, and that
together they had robbed the restaurant. 328 Although Marshall denied
complicity in the burglary, he was convicted on the accomplice
charge .329
Marshall, a black man, raised three different issues on appeal from
this verdict. 330 First, he alleged that the jury selection process in North
Dakota was unconstitutional, arguing that the "North Dakota's jury
317. 531 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1995).





323. Marshall, 531 N.W.2d at 285.
324. Id. The amount of cash found was within ten dollars of that stolen from the restaurant. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 285-86.
328. Marshall, 531 N.W.2d at 286. Cody stated that Marshall was too big to go through the
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selection process is based upon a system whereby many individuals of
minority races are excluded," thereby denying him and other minorities
an impartial jury venire.331 In addition, Marshall argued that he was
denied an impartial jury as the result of a "racist" jury instruction. 332
Lastly, Marshall contended that the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice was insufficient to convict. 33
3
Jury selection in North Dakota is governed by chapter 27-09.1 of
the North Dakota Century Code, which provides that "[a] citizen may
not be excluded from jury service in this state on account of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, physical disability, or economic status." 334
The purposeful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from the
jury for his criminal trial would deny an accused member of a racial
minority equal protection of the laws. 335 According to the court, the
evidence presented by Marshall to support this claim consisted of
unsubstantiated assertions without any record support. 336 The court
stated that "bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to show an
under representation of a distinct group." 337 The court stated that in
order for a defendant to show a facial violation of the Sixth Amendment,
he must show
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive"
group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that this under representation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection pro-
cess. 338
While Marshall met the first part of this inquiry, the court found that
the evidence presented to show under representation or systematic ex-
clusion was wholly insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.339
331. Id. Marshall is a very dark complected African-American, and was the only minority mem-
ber in the courtroom during the trial. Id.
332. Id.
333. Marshall, 531 N.W.2d at 286.
334. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-02 (1991)).
335. Id. (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)).
336. Id. at 287. Marshall offered data from a recent census report to show that there were 280
blacks among the approximately 103,000 people eligible for jury service in Cass County. Id. On the
basis of this evidence, Marshall claimed that there were "no blacks in the jury pool," and that
supplementation of the jury list would have increased the chance for blacks to be in the venire. Id.
337. Id. (quoting State v. Fredericks, 507 N.W.2d 61, 65 (N.D. 1993)).
338. Marshall, 531 N.W.2d at 286 (quoting Fredericks, 507 N.W.2d at 65).
339. Id. at 287.
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Because Marshall failed to show a purposeful exclusion, the court
concluded that the jury selection process was constitutional. 340
Marshall also argued that the instruction given to the jury was racist
thereby denying him of his right to an impartial jury. 341 According to
Marshall, the word "appearance" in the instruction suggested that the
jury take into account his race when considering his testimony. 342
Reviewing the jury instructions as a whole, an instruction is erroneous if
it "relates to a central subject in the case, and affects a substantial right
of the accused." 343 A judicial instruction which is intended to "inflame
the racial, religious, or ethnic prejudices of jurors" constitutes such an
error.
3 4 4
Construing the word in context, the court concluded that the in-
struction on "appearance" was not intended to mark a racial charac-
teristic but was rather meant to focus the attention of the jury on the
outward mannerisms of the witness which might reasonably affect
credibility. 345 Moreover, the court found that there was no racial sugges-
tion implicit in the instruction. 346 Thus, the court concluded that the
instruction was not improper so as to require a reversal of Marshall's
conviction .347
Lastly, Marshall argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him as it was based solely on the testimony of an uncorroborated accom-
plice.348 A person cannot be convicted upon the testimony of his
accomplice unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence that
tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. 349
The corroboration is insufficient if it merely shows the commission of
the offense, or surrounding circumstances. 350 While the testimony of the
accomplice need not be incriminating in itself, the inquiry is answered
when some material fact tending to connect the accused with the crime is
corroborated. 35 1 Based on the evidence presented at trial, the court
found that the testimony of Cody was sufficiently corroborated so as to
support the conviction of Marshall.352
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. "Appearance" was also mentioned with "manner" in the final written instructions to the
jury on "weight and credibility." Id.
343. Marshall, 531 N.W.2d at 287.
344. Id. (quoting State v. McKinney, 518 N.W.2d 696,702 (N.D. 1994)).
345. Id.
346. Id. at 288.
347. Id.
348. Marshall, 531 N.W.2d at 288.
349. Id.
350. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-21-14).
351. Id. (citing State v. Tones, 529 N.W.2d 853, 855 (N.D. 1995)).
352. Id.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
STATE V. JOHNSON
In State v. Johnson,353 Johnson appealed his district court convic-
tion of possession of a controlled substance. 354 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that probable cause did
not become stale when three days passed between discovery of marijuana
seeds and the application for the search warrant, that an officer withhold-
ing information from the magistrate regarding the fact that the marijua-
na seeds were not capable of germination was immaterial, and that there
was no violation of Johnson's Miranda355 rights.3 56
On January 27, 1994, a Sheridan County deputy sheriff took a
garbage bag off of Johnson's front yard. 357 The next day, an agent for
the South Sakakawea Drug Task Force found twenty-five marijuana
seeds while searching the bag.3 58 On February 2, the task force agent
obtained a search warrant for Johnson's house, and Johnson was arrested
and read his Miranda rights. 359 Thereafter, officers searched Johnson's
home. 360 Upon request, Johnson told officers where drugs and drug
paraphernalia were hidden.361 Johnson was eventually charged with
possession of a controlled substance.362
Johnson made a motion to suppress the evidence found in his home,
which was denied. 363 Johnson then entered a conditional guilty plea to
possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana. 364 After the
judgment was entered, he appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court,
claiming that probable cause to support the search warrant became stale,
probable cause to issue the search warrant would not have existed had a
police officer not withheld the fact that the seeds found in his garbage
bag were incapable of germination, and that his Miranda rights were
violated. 365
353. 531 N.W.2d 275 (ND. 1995).
354. State v. Johnson, 531 N.W.2d 275,277 (N D. 1995).
355. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444-445 (1966) (setting out procedural safeguards to
secure privilege against self incrimination).
356. Johnson, 531 N.W.2d at 278-80.
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With regard to the stale probable cause argument, Johnson relied on
the fact that the garbage bags were taken from the front of his house on
January 27, but a search warrant was not applied for until February 2.366
In rejecting his argument, the court noted that the number of days
between the occurrence of the facts relied upon and the issuance of the
warrant does not by itself determine probable cause. 367 Instead, when an
activity is of a "protracted and continuous nature" like drug use,
passage of time may not be relevant. 368 Thus, it was not improper for
the magistrate to conclude that more marijuana was probably inside
Johnson's house since it was found in his garbage. 369
Johnson also argued that probable cause to issue the search warrant
would not have been present had a police officer told the magistrate that
the seeds taken from his garbage bag were incapable of germination and
were of the type commonly found in birdseed. 370 However, the court
concluded that while the seeds being incapable of germination may be
an important fact at trial, it was not important in determining probable
cause, because the seeds found in the garbage bag were sufficient
evidence to indicate the likelihood of more marijuana being found in
Johnson's home. 371 Thus, the court did not agree with Johnson's
argument that had the magistrate known the seeds were incapable of
germination, probable cause would not have been found to issue the
search warrant. 372
Johnson's Miranda argument had two parts: he claimed that (1) he
was not given his Miranda rights prior to the search of his house, and (2)
even if he did properly receive them, it had not been shown that he
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. 373 At the
suppression hearing, Johnson claimed he did not remember that the
366. Johnson, 531 N.W.2d at 278. The court noted that it reviews the sufficiency of the evid-
ence using the totality of the circumstances, and probable cause to conduct a search exists "if the facts
and circumstances relied on by the magistrate would warrant a person of reasonable caution to
believe the contraband or evidence sought probably will be found in the place to be searched." Id.
(citations omitted).
367. Id. (citations omitted).
368. Id.
369. Id. The court was influenced by the fact that drug use is often habitual and continuous. Id.
To further his argument, Johnson also claimed there was no evidence as to the length of time the
garbage bag was outside his house before being seized. Id. But the court noted that because garbage
is picked up on a weekly basis, the magistrate reasonably concluded that the garbage bag was recently
placed outside of Johnson's house. Id.
370. Id.
371. Johnson, 531 N.W.2d at 279.
372. Id. When someone challenges a search warrant's validity because the information was
recklessly or intentionally omitted from the affidavit, it must be demonstrated that the information
would have been material to the findings by the magistrate. id. at 278.
373. Id.
796 [VOL. 72:763
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Miranda warnings were read to him. 374 However, there was testimony
that the Miranda warnings had been read to Johnson, and the trial court
concluded that they had been read accordingly. 375 The North Dakota
Supreme Court refused to disturb this conclusion, deferring to the trial
court's superior conditions to assess a witness' credibility. 376
With regard to the issue of whether Johnson knowingly and volun-
tarily waived his right to remain silent, the court relied on the
inevitable-discovery doctrine. 377 The court relied on the test set out by
the United States Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams,378 which requires
that the state show that the marijuana and drug paraphernalia would have
been discovered even without the alleged unlawfully obtained omission
by Johnson. 379 Relying on the fact that a valid search warrant was
obtained, the court concluded that the officers would have inevitably
found the drugs and paraphernalia even if Johnson had not told them
where to look. 380 Thus, the decision of the district court was affirmed. 38'
DOUBLE JEOPARDY-SUSPENSION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE
STATE V. ZMMERMAN
In State v. Zimmerman,382 Defendants Edward Zimmerman and
Albert Knutson appealed from their criminal convictions for driving
under the influence of alcohol, each arguing that the criminal prosecu-
tion constituted double jeopardy because his driver's license had been
previously suspended in an administrative proceeding relating to the
same conduct. 383 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed both con-
victions, concluding that criminal and administrative proceedings do not
constitute double jeopardy. 384
374. Id.
375. Id. at 279.
376. Johnson, 531 N.W.2d at 279. A ruling on a suppression matter will only be disturbed if
"there is insufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's determination
and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." Id.
377. Id. The court noted that North Dakota has a two part "inevitable-discovery" test. Id. at
279-80. One of the requirements is that police not act in bad faith. Id. at 280. The other part is the
test from Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
378. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
379. Johnson, 531 N.W.2d at 280. It was held in Nix, that the "evidence obtained as a result of
unlawful police conduct may be admissible at trial if the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the challenged evidence would have been inevitably or ultimately discovered by lawful
means in the course of the investigation." Id. (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 444).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. 539 N.W.2d 49 (N.D. 1995).
383. State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W2d 49,50 (N.D. 1995).
384. Id.
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Both Zimmerman and Knutson were separately charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of North Dakota
Century Code section 39-08-01; Knutson on December 31, 1994, and
Zimmerman on February 5, 1995.385 Each defendant had his driver's
license administratively suspended prior to trial. 38 6 Both Knutson and
Zimmer-man filed motions to dismiss the criminal charges arguing that
the administrative suspension of their driving privileges constituted
punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the
United States and North Dakota Constitutions. 38 7 After denial of their
motions to dismiss, Knutson and Zimmerman each entered a conditional
plea of guilty to the charges, and were convicted. 38 8 On appeal,
Zimmerman and Knutson contend that the administrative suspension of
their driving privileges for driving under the influence of alcohol
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy analysis, thus precluding
criminal punishment for the same traffic offense. 389
According to the North Dakota Supreme Court, administrative
proceedings are civil in nature, separate and distinct from the criminal
proceedings associated with an arrest for violating North Dakota Century
Code section 39-08-01.390 The court distinguished civil proceedings
from criminal, concluding that the legislature has created two primary
methods of dealing with drunk drivers.391 First, the court recognized that
the legislature has enacted criminal proceedings to deter and punish
drunk driving. 392 North Dakota Century Code section 39-08-01 makes
it a misdemeanor for any person to drive or be in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle upon a highway with a blood-alcohol content of at
least ten one-hundredths of one percent.393
In addition, "to protect the traveling public by temporarily remov-
ing drunk drivers from the highways," the legislature has enacted civil
proceedings. 394 These civil proceedings are best exemplified by the
Implied Consent Act, found in North Dakota Century Code Chapter
39-20. 395 Under this Act, any person who operates a motor vehicle on a




388. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 51.
389. Id. at 53.
390. Id. at 52.
391. Id. at 51.
392. Id.
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the alcohol content of his or her blood.396 Violation of this Act can
result in suspension or revocation of the person's driving privileges. 397
Beginning with the decision in State v. Sinner,398 the North Dakota
Supreme Court has stated that the administrative suspension of a driver's
license due to criminal convictions for traffic violations is not double
jeopardy as it is not a penalty. 399 According to the court, use of the
public highways is a privilege, not an absolute right, which a person
enjoys subject to the control of the state through the exercise of its
police power.400 A driver must obey the laws of the state because these
laws are intended to make highway travel within the state safe.401 In
addition, since the driving privilege is subject to control and regulation
by the state, a driver's license may be suspended or revoked for violation
of these laws, even though the loss of driving privileges may create a
substantial hardship on the person.402
In support of their appeal, Zimmerman and Knutson cite to recent
United States Supreme Court decisions which they contend overrule the
effect of Sinner.40 3 However, according to the North Dakota Supreme
Court, the revocation of a privilege is not ordinarily considered punish-
ment. 40 4 The court observed that the United States Supreme Court has
stated that the "revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted" is a
remedial sanction "characteristically free of the punitive criminal
element." 40 5 Citing to numerous other state appellate court decisions,
the North Dakota Supreme Court found the instant case distingishable
from the cases cited by Zimmerman and Knutson.406
According to the court, separate criminal and administrative pro-
ceedings do not constitute double jeopardy. 407 Rather, an administrative
license suspension or revocation is premised on "substantial remedial
396. Id.
397. Id. at 51-52.
398. 207 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1973).
399. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 52.
400. Id. (quoting State v. Kouba, 319 N.W.2d 161, 163 (N.D. 1982)).
401. Id. (quoting Kouba, 319 N.W.2d at 163).
402. Id.
403. Id. at 53. In particular, the Defendants cite to United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440
(1989), and Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), for two
propositions. First, Zimmerman and Knutson argue that a civil sanction which does not fairly serve a
remedial purpose but rather serves as a deterrent, is considered punishment. Id. (citing United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)). Secondly, according to Zimmerman and Knutson, these cases
hold that where a defendant has already been punished in a criminal prosecution, that person may not
also be subjected to an additional civil sanction where the second sanction serves as a deterrent or
retribution. Id. (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49).
404. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 52.
405. Id. (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)).
406. Id. at 54-55 (citations omitted).
407. Id. at 54.
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purposes." 40 8 The "revocation or suspension of a license operates for
the benefit of the public and is not intended as a penalty inflicted upon
the license holder."409 It serves the remedial purpose of protecting
public safety by "quickly removing potentially dangerous drivers from
the roads." 410 Thus, the state's "compelling interest in highway safety
justifies the administrative suspension." 4 11 In the opinion of the court,
any punitive or deterrent effect as a result of an administrative license
suspension is merely incidental to this important remedial purpose.
412
DRAM SHOP AcT-LIABILITY OF HOST
ZUEGER V. CARLSON
In Zueger v. Carlson,4 13 Lillian Zueger and LeRoy Kudrna appealed
from a district court decision granting summary judgment and dismiss-
ing their tort claims against Boomers bar. 414 The North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings, holding that the release of a dram shop claim does
not constitute a release of all other claims, and that bar owners have a
duty to protect patrons from assaults. 4 15
According to their complaint, appellants Zueger and Kudrna were
injured at Boomers bar on October 29, 1993, when an off-duty bouncer
attacked them without provocation.416 As a result of the attack, both
appellants suffered permanent injuries. 4 17 Boomers had a dram shop
liability policy and a comprehensive general liability policy. 4 18 The
claim under the dram shop policy was settled for $10,000.419 Appellants
then, however, brought an action under the premise liability policy, and
Boomers responded with a motion for summary judgment, claiming that
the premise liability claims were dram shop claims under another
name.420 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
408. Id. (quoting State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744,758 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
409. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d at 55 (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 78 N.W.2d 395,399 (N.D.
1956)).
410. Id. (quoting State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (Vt. 1992)).
411. Id. (quoting Kobilansky v. Liffrig, 358 N.W.2d 781,791 (N.D. 1984)).
412. Id.
413. 542 N.W.2d 92 (N.D. 1996).
414. Zueger v. Carlson. 542 N.W.2d 92, 93 (NfD. 1996).
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. According to the appellants, Boomers employees failed to come to their aid and the
assault was not stopped until other patrons restrained the off-duty bouncer. Id.
418. Id.
419. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 93-94. The release specifically left open claims for "negligent se-
curity, failure to provide adequate security, failure to stop an assault or other premises liability
claims." Id. at 94.
420. Id. at 94.
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Boomers, concluding that all forms of bar owner liability were supersed-
ed by the Dram Shop Act and that the appellants had not established a
bar owner's common law duty to provide security. 42 1 The appellants
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.422
On appeal, Boomers argued that summary judgment was appropri-
ate for four reasons: that appellants failed to provide evidence that
raised a genuine issue of material fact, that all common law liability for
bar owners is superseded by the Dram Shop Act, that Boomers had no
duty to provide security for the appellants or stop the assault, and that
allowing the appellants to pursue the claim would be improperly splitting
a cause of action.423 Boomers' claim that the appellants did not raise a
genuine issue of material fact was based on the argument that appellants
were required to present evidence that Boomers had failed to provide
adequate security, and that the appellants failed to do so.424 However,
the court rejected that argument, noting that Boomers had not
challenged the factual basis for the appellants' claim, but had raised
purely legal issues.4 25  Therefore, the court concluded that since
Boomers had not established the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, the appellants were not required to submit evidence to support the
factual allegations of their claim.426
Boomers next argued that the release of appellants' dram shop
claims released Boomers from all liability because the Dram Shop Act
supersedes all of a bar owner's common law liability. 427 The argument
was based on section 1-01-06 which provides that there is no common
law in cases where the North Dakota Century Code declares law. 428 The
court rejected this argument, noting that the state legislature intended the
Dram Shop Act to create a completely new form of liability for wrong-
fully selling alcohol, and that the act had no relation to any common law
421. Id.; see also infra note 427 (setting out North Dakota's Dram Shop Act).
422. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 94.
423. Id. at 94-97.
424. Id. at 94.
425. Id. Instead of challenging the factual basis for the appellants' claim, Boomers argued that
the release of dram shop liability acted as a release of all claims, and allowing appellants to proceed
was an improper splitting of causes of action. Id.
426. Id. at 94-95.
427. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 95. The North Dakota Dram Shop Act provides in pertinent part:
Every spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured by any
obviously intoxicated person has a claim for relief for fault under section 32-03.2-02
against any person who knowingly disposes, sells, barters, or gives away alcoholic
beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, an incompetent, or an obviously
intoxicated person, and if death ensues, the survivors of the decedent are entitled to
damages defined in section 32-21-02.
N.D. CENTr. CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987).
428. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 95.
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liability or tort theory. 429 Therefore, by adopting the Dram Shop Act,
the legislature had not intended to supersede other, unrelated
premises-based of liability claims against bar owners. 430 Liquor estab-
lishments have a common law duty to maintain a safe environment for
their customers just like the duty any business owes to people it invites
onto its premises, and the Dram Shop Act does not affect that duty.431
Boomers tried to further their argument by relying on the language of
Stewart v. Ryan,432 a 1994 North Dakota Supreme Court case.
4 33
Specifically, Boomers claimed Stewart ruled that under comparative
fault, all fault included dram shop, and therefore dram shop includes all
fault. 434 However, the court pointed out that Boomers misread Stewart,
because the opinion holds only that dram shop liability is to be consid-
ered when comparing fault, and does not require dram shop liability to
supersede all other common law actions. 4 35
In the alternative, Boomers argued that even if common law liability
was not superseded by dram shop liability, it had no duty to provide
security or to intervene in the assault after it began.436 The court reject-
ed this argument as well, noting that the issue of a bar owner's duty to
protect customers from assaults was one of first impression for North
Dakota. 437 The court then turned to section 344 of the Restatement of
Torts, which provides that a possessor of land who holds the land open
for business to the public is liable for physical harm caused by acts of
third persons and by the failure of the land possessor to discover that the
acts are being done or give adequate warning. 438 Furthermore, comment
f of section 344 states that when a land possessor may have reason to
429. Id. (quoting Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 153 (N.D. 1989)).
430. Id.
431. Id. (quoting Manuel v. Weitzman, 191 N.W.2d 474,476 (Mich. 1971)).
432. 520 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1994).
433. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 95.
434. Id. at 95-96. The specific language Boomers relied on stated that "negligence, willful con-
duct, and dram shop liability are all integrated." Id. at 96 (quoting Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 46).
435. Id. at 96. The court further noted that Stewart integrates negligence, willful conduct, and
dram shop only for allocating fault under comparative fault, and that negligence continues to be a
theory separate from dram shop liability. Id. (quoting Stewart, 520 N.W.2d at 46).
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 96 (citing RESTATEmENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965)). Section
344 provides that:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is
subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a
purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful
acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise
reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable visitors to avoid the harm, or
otherwise to protect them against it.
RFSTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965).
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know that there is likelihood of conduct by third persons that may
endanger the safety of visitors, the land possessor should anticipate
careless conduct on the part of third persons and therefore may be under
a duty to take action against it.43 9 Relying on section 344, the court
concluded that a bar owner owes a duty to protect customers from
assault when the owner has reason to anticipate conduct by third persons
which may endanger patrons.440 The appellants contended that Boomers
knew fights had occurred in the past and that the off-duty bouncer who
had assaulted them was violent because he had been involved in past
altercations.441 Therefore, the court ruled that the trial court erred in
ruling that Boomers had no duty to protect the appellants from attack or
to come to their aid once the attack had begun.442
Finally, Boomers claimed that allowing the appellants to pursue
common law claims after releasing Boomers from dram shop liability
would constitute an inappropriate splitting of a cause of action.443 The
court rejected this argument as well, noting that past decisions have held
that the rule against splitting causes of action does not pertain when a
defendant consents to such a splitting. 444 Boomers made an express
agreement with the appellants which stated that release of dram shop
liability claim did not release them from any other claims under
Boomers' premise liability policy. 4 45 Because Boomers expressly
consented to a splitting of the dram shop and common law claims, such a
split was allowable .446
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the
case was remanded for further proceedings.447
FAMILY LAW- DIVORCE- DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS
BELL V. BELL
In Bell v. Bell,4 4 8 Kyle Bell appealed from a divorce judgment in
which the district court awarded his ex-wife Kimberly Engelstad all
439. Zueger, 542 N.W.2d at 96-97 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965).
440. Id. at 97. The court also looked to courts in other states which rely on section 344 to rule
that bar owners have a duty to patrons to protect them from assault when the owner has reason to








447. Id. at 98.
448. 540 N.W.2d 602 (N.D. 1995).
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remaining assets in the marital estate. 449 The North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the district court judgment, holding that the award of all
remaining marital assets to a party to a divorce is justified when the other
party dissipates most of the marital estate through an "illegal flight from
justice."450
In October of 1993, Bell and Engelstad were married and had one
child, a son, born in January of 1994.451 During the marriage, Bell
received an $80,000 wrongful death award, after his father and grand-
mother died in a car accident. 452 In April 1994, the parties separated
after Bell was arrested for gross sexual imposition upon children, and for
use of minors in sexual performances. 453 After his arrest, Bell posted
$20,000 bail and fled to Colorado, forfeiting the bond. 454 Bell was
arrested in August 1994, and none of the $80,000 award was left. 455
Additionally, Bell was over $34,000 in arrears on his child support
obligation, having paid no part of the obligation with the award. 456
Engelstad sued for divorce on September 16, 1994. At the trial on
April 24, 1995, Engelstad appeared in person and was represented by
counsel; Bell appeared through counsel and by telephone deposition. 457
The district court awarded all marital assets to Engelstad, basing this
award on Bell's criminal conduct and the suffering he had put Engelstad
through. 458 Bell appealed, claiming it is improper for North Dakota
courts to consider fault in making property awards.459
Before addressing the merits of Bell's appeal of the property award,
the North Dakota Supreme Court considered the significance of the fact
that a complete transcript of the trial was not provided to the court.460
Engelstad argued that the decision of the district court should be affirm-
ed because Bell did not provide a complete transcript. 461 Bell countered
that he should not be prejudiced by the lack of a transcript because he
was indigent, and that the transcript requirement should be waived or the
state should provide one.462 The court ruled that North Dakota Rule of
449. Bell v. Bell, 540 N.W.2d 602,602 (N.D. 1995).
450. Id. at 603.
451. Id. Bell's parental rights were terminated sometime after May, 1994. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. The criminal case involving Bell was also heard by the North Dakota Supreme Court.
State v. Bell, 540 N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1995).
454. Bell, 540 N.W.2d at 603.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Id. Bell could not appear in person because he was incarcerated. Id. at 604.
458. Id.
459. Bell, 540 N.W.2d at 604.
460. Id. at 603.
461. Id.
462. Id. Bell claimed that his indigence was a result of his incarceration and the fact that the trial
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Appellate Procedure 10(b) requires the appellant to order a transcript,
and the rule does not allow a transcript to be provided at the state's
expense for indigent defendants in civil cases or for waiver of transcript
fees. 4 6 3 Furthermore, when the record on appeal does not allow for
meaningful review, the North Dakota Supreme Court will decline
review.4 64 Review was not declined in this appeal, however, because the
court was provided with a partial transcript and also had a copy of Bell's
telephone deposition.465
On appeal, Bell argued that North Dakota courts may not regard
fault when making property awards, while Engelstad claimed that when
misconduct is extreme, a property award giving every asset to one party
can be equitable. 466 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
award of all remaining marital assets to Engelstad, noting that the unusu-
al facts in this case justified such a result. 467 The court noted that in
making an award of property in divorce proceedings, the district court
should follow the Ruff-Fischer guidelines.468 One factor in these guide-
lines is the parties' conduct during the marriage. 469 The court also
noted that any substantial disparity in the trial court's property division
must be explained. 470
The North Dakota Supreme Court then discussed the property
distribution at issue, noting that while an award of all the assets to one
spouse is as large of a substantial disparity as possible, the unusual
circumstances in the case merited such a result. 47 1 The unusual circum-
stances included Bell's dissipating the $80,000 wrongful death award,
which was the biggest asset in the marriage. 472 According to the court,
Bell gave himself about ninety percent of the marital assets, and spent the
money without any concern for his wife or child support obligations.4 73
court awarded all the marital assets to Engelstad. Id.
463. Id. The purpose of Rule 10(b) is to allow the North Dakota Supreme Court to fully under-
stand the facts and the rationale for the trial court's decision. Id. An appellant who does not provide a
transcript assumes the consequences because it is the appellant who has the burden of showing that the
trial court erred. Id. at 604.
464. Bell, 540 N.W.2d at 603-04.
465. Id. at 604.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 605.
468. Id. at 604 (citing Ruff v. Ruff, 52 N.W.2d 107 (N.D. 1952), and Fischer v. Fischer, 139
N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1966)). In making a property distribution, the trial court must include all the
property of the marital estate, including inherited property. Id.
469. Bell, 540 N.W.2d at 604 (quoting Ruff, 52 N.W.2d at 11). Some members of the North
Dakota Supreme Court would limit their contemplation of misconduct to economic misconduct;
however, both economic and non-economic misconduct were present in this case. Id. at 605.
470. Id.
471. Id. The total assets of the marital estate amounted to approximately $7,580.75. Id. Also,
the total debt was $36,006.65, with $34,406.65 of that attributable to the child support obligation owed
by Bell. Id.
472. Id. at 605.
473. Id.
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Because Bell wasted so much of the marital assets, the trial court did not
err in awarding Engelstad all remaining assets.4 74 Accordingly, the
judgment of the district court was affirmed.475
INFANTS-DETERMINATION OF RIGHT OF CUSTODY
OwAN v. OwAvN
In Owan v. Owan ,476 Rayann Owan appealed a district court divorce
decree which awarded custody of her daughter, Danika, to her ex-
husband, Stephen Owan. 477 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed
the custody award and remanded the case to district court for a reconsid-
eration of custody, after the district court made findings of domestic
violence .478
Rayann and Stephen were married in 1990, and their daughter was
born in 1991.479 After a turbulent marriage that lasted four years,
Rayann sued for divorce in February 1994, and was awarded temporary
custody of Danika. 480 At the divorce proceedings, Rayann testified as to
several episodes of Stephen's violent behavior.4 81 Specifically, Rayann
testified that Stephen kicked through a locked bathroom door, threw a
cordless phone, and put her up against the wall, and hit it, in an attempt
to scare her.482 Rayann also testified that Stephen threatened to kill her
if she left him, and that he threatened suicide on several occasions.4 83
The trial court awarded Stephen custody of Danika, with child support to
be paid by Rayann. 484 Rayann appealed to the North Dakota Supreme
Court .485
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's custody
award, concluding that the trial court erred by not giving enough atten-
tion to the statutory presumption against awarding custody to a parent
who has committed domestic violence. 486 The statutory presumption
474. Bell, 540 N.W.2d at 605.
475. Id.
476. 541 N.W.2d 719 (N.D. 1996).
477. Owan v. Owan, 541 N.W.2d 719, 720 (N.D. 1996).
478. Id.
479. Id. The two lived together two years before they were married, and moved several times
between Arizona, Minnesota, and Williston, North Dakota. Id.
480. Id. Before the trial began, Stephen moved back to Arizona and Rayann became pregnant
by a man she intended to marry. Id.
481. Id.





486. Id. The statutory presumption arises from section 14-09-06.2(1)j), which states:
In awarding custody or granting rights of visitation, the court shall consider evidence of
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makes domestic violence the foremost factor in determining child
custody.487 To rebut the presumption, the violent parent has the burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that other circumstances
exist which require the child to be placed with the violent parent. 488 The
trial court, relying upon the testimony of Stephen's social worker
witness, found that Stephen's physical altercations were minor.489
The supreme court concluded, for several reasons, that this finding
was unsatisfactory. 490 First, it was improper to rely on Stephen's social
worker witness to give trial testimony as an expert as to Stephen's
conduct. 49 1 The social worker witness testified that the violence was
situational in terms of marital discord and not a pattern in Stephen's
life.492 Stephen claimed that the trial court's finding should be affirmed
because the witness did not make any finding of credible evidence of
domestic violence. 493 The court rejected this argument, agreeing with
Rayann, that if the trial court intended to adopt the findings of the
expert, more evidence is required. 494 A trial court cannot delegate its
statutory responsibility to make findings on domestic violence.49 5
Specifically, a court cannot make an independent investigator's report
the decisive element of its decision as to custody of the child.496 Section
14-09-06.2(1)(j) of the North Dakota Century Code specifically directs
the trial court to make findings about domestic violence and to show that
the custodial arrangement protects both the child and parent who was
subject to domestic violence, and this duty cannot be delegated. 4 97
Furthermore, the trial court's findings did not allow adequate review of
the extensive evidence of violence committed by Stephen.498
domestic violence. If the court finds credible evidence that domestic violence has
occurred, this evidence creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has
perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded sole or joint custody of a child. This
presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the bests
interests of the child require that parent's participation as a custodial parent. The court
shall cite specific findings of fact to show that the custody or visitation arrangement best
protects the child and the parent or other family or household member who is the victim
of domestic violence.
Id. at 720-21 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(l)(j)(Supp. 1995)).
487. Owan, 541 N.w.2d at 721.
488. Id.




492. Owan, 541 N.W.2d at 721.
493. Id.
494. Id. at 721-22.
495. Id. at 722.
496. Id. (citations omitted). The reason for this is based in the notion that the trial court does not
have the authority to delegate the power to decide questions regarding child custody. Id.
497. Owan, 541 N.W.2d at 722. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (Supp. 1995).
498. Owan, 541 N.W.2d at 722.
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Second, the trial court failed to make adequate findings regarding
Stephen's allegations that Rayann slapped and scratched him.499 When
domestic violence is committed by both parents, the trial court must
measure the amount of violence committed by each.500 If the violence
committed by one parent is significantly greater than that committed by
the other, the statutory presumption against custody only applies to the
parent who committed the greater domestic violence. 501 However, if the
amount of violence committed by the parents is roughly the same, and
both parties are found to be fit parents, a presumption against awarding
custody to either parent does not exist.502 Instead, the trial court is to
consider the remaining best interests of the child factors to make a
custody decision. 503 Because the trial court did not weigh the violent
conduct described in the testimony or measure the disposition of each
parent for continued violence, the trial court's findings on domestic
violence were insufficient, and the case was reversed and remanded for
such findings.504
Justice Sandstrom dissented, stating that the best interests of the
child outweigh any other factors.505 According to Justice Sandstrom, a
parent-child relationship can only be altered if it is in the best interests of
the child, and the majority failed to discuss such interests. 506 While
domestic violence is unacceptable, the goal of punishing violent parents
does not justify a child custody award that is not in the best interests of
the child.507 Furthermore, in determining the proportionality of inter-
vention by the government in raising children, the only relevant consid-
eration is whether the intervention promotes the best interests of the
child. 508 Because the majority failed to properly consider the best
interests of the child, Justice Sandstrom dissented. 509
499. Id.
500. Id. (quoting Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 850 (N.D. 1995)).
501. Id. (quoting Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 850).
502. Id. (quoting Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 850). When the violence is proportional, the trial court
should also consider which parent is least likely to continue to act violently. Id.
503. Owan, 541 N.W.2d at 722 (quoting Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 850).
504. Id. at 722-23.
505. Id. at 723 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 Am. JuR. 2D Infants § 43 (1969)).
506. Id.
507. Id. The majority's analysis is constitutionally infirm because it does not limit child custody
consideration of domestic violence to the extent it concerns the best interests of the child. Id.
508. Owan, 541 N.W.2d at 723 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,650 (1972)).
509. Id. at 724.
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INFANTS-DETERMINATION OF RIGHT OF CUSTODY
McADAMS v. MCADAMS
In McAdams v. McAdams,510 Carmen McAdams appealed a district
court divorce judgment splitting custody of her two sons between her
and her ex-husband, Keith. 51' Carmen also appealed the district court's
denial of her motion for a new trial. 512 The North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case
for a new trial, finding that when one parent willfully alienates a child
from another parent, custody may not be awarded to that parent.513
Keith and Carmen were divorced, in 1992, after Carmen removed
their two children from Bismarck to New York without Keith's knowl-
edge or consent.5 14 The district court awarded Kenneth custody of the
oldest son, Kenneth, and custody of the younger son, Bryan, to
Carmen.5 15 This custody award was based on information that Keith had
completely alienated Kenneth, from Carmen, and that a significant
amount of professional help would be required to re-establish a healthy
relationship between Kenneth and his mother.516 Custody of the youn-
ger son was awarded to Carmen since their relationship was not as
seriously damaged.517
Carmen moved for a new trial, which was denied.51 8 She then
appealed the decision to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that
the district court erred in awarding split custody, and that the district
court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a new trial because
of insufficient evidence and irregularity of the proceedings.519
In considering the judgment of the district court, the supreme court
noted that split custody is generally looked upon unfavorably.520 In the
present case, Keith had already alienated Kenneth, from his mother, and
510. 530 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1995).
511. McAdams v. McAdams, 530 N.W.2d 647,648-49 (N.D. 1995).
512. Id. at 649. Carmen's request for a new trial was based on irregularity of the proceedings
and insufficient evidence.
513. Id. at 650.
514. Id. at 649. Keith filed for a divorce in North Dakota, and Carmen filed in New York. Id.
The New York district court concluded that North Dakota had jurisdiction and dismissed Carmen's
action. Id. A custody investigator, appointed by the district court of Burleigh County, concluded that
Carmen should be awarded custody of both children because Keith suffered from a personality
disorder and may have abused Carmen. Id.
515. Id.
516. McAdams, 530 N.W.2d at 649-50.
517. Id. at 650.
518. Id. at 649. The judge recused himself after denying the motion for a new trial. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 650.
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was likely to prevent Kenneth, from developing a healthy relationship
with Carmen. 52 1 The decision of the district court, in awarding custody
of Kenneth to Keith, effectively terminated Kenneth and Carmen's
relationship without considering the best interests of the child.522 The
supreme court found that because the district court failed to consider the
children's best interests, the judgment of split custody was clearly errone-
ous. 523 The supreme court concluded that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the district court's decision; thus, the district court
abused its discretion by denying Carmen's motion for a new trial.524
The supreme court also considered Carmen's motion for a new trial,
based on irregularity in the proceedings. 525 The irregularity asserted by
Carmen was a conversation held between the custody investigator and the
district court judge before the court arrived at its decision.526 However,
the supreme court noted that the judge had already made his decision
prior to this conversation, that he did not rely on any information the
investigator provided, and that the judge recused himself after denying
Carmen's motion for a new trial.527 Although the communication may
have appeared improper, it did not influence the judge's decision and
therefore was not prejudicial to Carmen. 528 Accordingly, a new trial was
not ordered on the grounds of irregularity in the proceedings. 5 29
Nonetheless, a new trial was ordered based on the finding that the district
court's decision of split custody was clearly erroneous.530
INSURANCE -NO-FAULT COVERAGE
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE Co. V. ESTATE OF GABEL
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Estate of
Gabel,531 the wife of Kenneth Gabel and his estate (Gabels) appealed
from an order of summary judgment dismissing their claims against
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for benefits under
521. McAdams, 530 N.W.2d at 650.
522. Id.
523. Id. The court noted that a child's best interests are furthered when the relationship with the
non custodial parent is nurtured. Id. (citing Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831,834 (N.D. 1993)).
524. Id.
525. Id. at 651.
526. McAdams, 530 N.W.2d at 651. It was alleged that the judge told the investigator that the
result of his decision would be to give each parent "a child to destroy." Id. It was further alleged that
the judge said his decision would likely result in both parties leaving the state and the court "will be rid




530. Id. at 650.
531. 539 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1995).
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their no-fault insurance policy and from an order denying their motion
for attorney's fees. 532
On February 23, 1993, Kenneth Gabel suffered an aneurysm while
driving his pickup truck in a Dickinson parking lot; his pickup subse-
quently smashed into a building across the street from the parking lot.533
The parties stipulated that the cause of death was the ruptured aneurysm,
which was neither caused by, nor aggravated by, the collision. 534 The
Gabels sought coverage from State Farm, their automobile insurer, under
the policy's no-fault clause.535
The Gabels were denied benefits under the policy by State Farm. 536
Thereafter, State Farm initiated a declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine any obligations under the policy.537 Based on the facts stipulated
to by the parties, State Farm moved for summary judgment.538 Alleging
bad-faith, the Gabels counterclaimed and requested an award of attor-
ney's fees. 539 The district court denied the Gabels' counterclaim and
request for attorney's fees, and granted State Farm's motion for summa-
ry judgment. 540 The Gabels, citing to Weber v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,541 argued that Kenneth Gabel was "occupy-
ing" the vehicle within the meaning of the no-fault statute, and therefore
they were entitled to partial summary judgment on the company's
obligations under the policy.542
However, according to the North Dakota Supreme Court, occupancy
is not the only no-fault requirement that must be satisfied under the
statute. 543 In addition to the occupancy requirement, the injury must
arise out of the operation of a motor vehicle .544 "Operation of a motor
vehicle" is defined as "operation, maintenance, or use of a vehicle as a
vehicle." 545 Looking to the Comment to the Uniform Motor Vehicle
Accident Reparations Act, upon which the North Dakota Auto Accident
Reparations Act (Act) is based, the court concluded that "[t]he policy of









541. 284 N.W.2d 299 (ND. 1979).
542. Estate of Gabel, 539 N.W.2d at 292.
543. Id.
544. Id. Under the North Dakota Auto Accident Reparations Act, "'accidental bodily injury' is
'injury ... arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle, and which is accidental as to the person
claiming basic or optional excess no-fault benefits."' Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-01(1)
(1995)).
545. Id. at 292-93 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-01(13)).
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the Act is to provide coverage for injury resulting directly from motor-
ing accidents and to leave to other forms of insurance and compensation
systems those losses which are tangential to motoring." 546
According to the court, "[t]he automobile must provide more than
the location of the injury." 547 The fact that the injury took place in a
motor vehicle "does not transport the accident into the scope of the
no-fault act." 548 The court noted that "[t]he Gabels offered no evi-
dence showing that the aneurysm was caused by any aspect of the use of
the motor vehicle as a motor vehicle."549 Finding that the aneurysm was
neither caused by, nor aggravated by the accident, the supreme court
concluded that Kenneth Gabel's death was not a result of the operation
of a motor vehicle. 550
The supreme court also recognized that the Act requires the injury
to be accidental as to the person claiming benefits. 551 Quoting from
Kordell v. Allstate Insurance Co.,552 the North Dakota Supreme Court
opined that death resulting from natural processes unrelated to the
automobile accident is not an accident under the no-fault act.553 Point-
ing out that there was no legislative intent for the no-fault law to include
coverage for bodily injuries resulting from internal causes, rather than
external causes, the court concluded that Kenneth Gabel's death, as a
result of an aneurysm unrelated to motoring, was not an accident within
the definition of the Act.554
Lastly, the Gabels asserted that the language of the policy obligates
State Farm to pay attorney's fees and expenses.555 The Supreme Court
stated that "[w]hen the language of an insurance contract is 'clear and
explicit, the language should not be strained in order to impose liability
on the insurer."' 556 Finding that the "What We Pay" section under the
"No-Fault" heading did not list attorney's fees for actions against the
insurer, the court declined to impose this liability on State Farm.557 The
Gabels' contended that State Farm should be required to reimburse the
Gabels for attorney's fees and expenses incurred because State Farm
546. Id. at 293 (citing Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act § l(a)(6) cmt., 14
U.L.A. 47 (1995)).




551. Id. (citing N.D.C.C. § 26.1-41-01(1)).
552. 554 A.2d 1,2 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
553. Estate of Gabel, 539 N.W.2d at 293-94.
554. Id. at 293 (citing JFK Memorial Hosp. v. Kendal, 501 A.2d 192, 199 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Dev. 1985)).
555. Id. at 294.
556. Id. (quoting Stetson v. Blue Cross of N. Dakota, 261 N.W.2d 894, 897 (ND. 1978)).
557. Id.
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initiated this declaratory action.5 58  The court responded that pursuant
to the "American Rule," 559 the Gabels' would be required to bear their
own attorney's fees.560
JURY-ERRONEOus DISMISSAL FOR CAUSE
LARSON V. WILLiAMS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
In Larson v. Williams Electric Cooperative, Inc.,561 the district court
judge excused all the members of Defendant Williams Electric Coopera-
tive (Williams) from the forty person jury selection panel. 562 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for
a new trial, concluding that potential jurors may not be excluded for
cause merely because they are members of the defendant cooperative
unless there is an individualized inquiry beforehand. 563
Larson, a dairy farmer, was a member of Williams Electric Coopera-
tive and used Williams' electricity to run milking equipment. 564 Soon
after the milking equipment was installed using Williams' electricity,
milk production dropped, the livestock became nervous around the
milking equipment, and cows began to suffer from a bacterial infection
called mastitis. 565 Consequently, the entire livestock was replaced. 566
However, the same problems developed in the new livestock.567 Larson's
veterinarian investigated the problem and suggested that the problem was
electrical.568 Larson complained extensively to Williams, noting that he
was also getting shocked by the equipment, and, in an attempt to remedy
the problem, Williams installed a blocker on Larson's electrical line to
stop the stray voltage problems. 569 Thereafter, the problems in the herd
and milking ended.570 Williams claimed that the improvements were not
558. Estate of Gabel, 539 N.W.2d at 294.
559. Id. (citing Duchscherer v. W.W. Waliwork, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 13, 16 (N.D. 1995)). Under
the American Rule, it is generally assumed that a party to a suit will pay its own attorney fees, unless a
statute authorizes otherwise. Duchscherer, 534 N.W.2d at 16.
560. Id.
561. 534 N.W.2d I (N.D. 1995).
562. Larson v. Williams Elec. Coop., Inc., 534 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (N.D. 1995). After the trial the
jury entered a judgment against Williams. Id. at 2.
563. Id. at 4.
564. Id. at 2.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Larson, 534 N.W.2d at 2.
568. Id. The electrical problem at issue was stray voltage. Id. at 1. This problem occurs when
stray voltage goes from an appliance through the ground. Id. at 2 n.1. If a cow is standing nearby, the
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the result of the blocker being installed, but instead were due to deficien-
cies which Williams corrected after the farm was inspected by the North
Dakota Electrical Inspector. 571 Larson brought suit for damages to the
dairy operation caused by the stray voltage. 572
Before trial, the judge excluded from the forty person jury selection
panel all members of Williams, on the basis that they were interested
parties because they receive their power from Williams. 573 At trial, the
jury returned a $429,506 verdict against Williams.574 Williams appealed
to the North Dakota Supreme Court, claiming that it was improper to
dismiss the twelve members of Williams from the jury selection panel,
and that the statute of limitations had run on Larson's claim.5 75
Noting that the standard of review is abuse of discretion for trial
court rulings on jury challenges, the North Dakota Supreme Court
agreed with Williams that it was improper to dismiss the potential jurors,
and reversed and remanded on this ground. 576 Relying on prior case
law, the court stated that a juror's membership in a cooperative, where
the cooperative is a party in a lawsuit, does not automatically disqualify a
juror as an interested party. 577 Rather, to disqualify a prospective juror,
actual bias must be established. 578 Specifically, one must challenge a
potential juror for cause.579 The court noted that section 28-14-06(5) of
the North Dakota Century Code, when read in conjunction with North
Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 47(c), requires the potential juror's
interest in a lawsuit's outcome to be analyzed, and after doing this, a
potential juror may be excused for cause.5 80 The North Dakota Su-
preme Court further noted that it is the policy of the state to select jurors
571. Id.
572. Larson, 534 N.W.2d at 1.
573. Id. at 2-3. The record as to arguments regarding dismissal of the jurors was missing, and the
court was disturbed by this. Id. at 3, n.2. The court concluded that court personnel may have lost the
notes about disqualification of the prospective jurors who were members of Williams and the voir dire
examination of them. Id. At oral argument, both parties agreed that evidence regarding the interests
of the Williams members had not been presented to the trial court. Id.
574. Id. at 2.
575. Id. at 2, 5.
576. Id. at 5.
577. Larson, 534 N.W.2d at 3.
578. Id. (citing Cassady v. Souris River Tel. Coop., 520 N.W.2d 803, 806 (N.D. 1994)). The
North Dakota Supreme Court has refused to adopt an automatic disqualification rule for. potential
jurors. Id.
579. Id. at 4.
580. Id. Challenges for cause may be taken on the grounds of "[i]nterest on the part of the juror
in the event of the action, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as a
member or citizen of a municipal corporation." N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-14-06(5) (1991). Further:
If the trial judge, after the examination of any juror, is of the opinion that grounds for
challenge for cause are present, the judge should excuse that juror from the trial of the
case. If the judge does not excuse the juror, any party may challenge the juror for cause
as provided by law.
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from a fair cross section of the population, and this policy was violated
by removing all the parties of Williams because it excluded an identifi-
able group.581 Because no individualized inquiry was made in the
selection process, the case was reversed and remanded.
582
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred, agreeing that prospective
jurors should not be excluded because of status. 583  However,
VandeWalle argued that there was no equal protection right that had to
be vindicated because there was nothing to indicate that the jury used
was prejudiced or less competent than a jury that included members of
Williams.584 Although he noted that he would have preferred to affirm
the decision of the district court, VandeWalle agreed to side with the
majority supporting their effort to make a statement as to the importance
with which we regard our jury system. 585 He noted, however, that this
decision should have little value as precedent, since few errors regarding




In State v. Robles,587 Appellant Jaime Robles raised two issues on
appeal of his conviction for aggravated assault.588 First, Robles contend-
ed that the panel from which his jury was selected did not represent a fair
cross-section of the community and thus violated section 27-09.1-05 of
the North Dakota Century Code.589 Second, Robles contended that the
jury selection process violated his right to an impartial jury under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 590 The North
581. Larson, 534 N.W.2d at 4. The court noted that people called to serve on a jury are to "'be
selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court."' Id.
(quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-01 (1991)).
582. Id. Williams also appealed the district court's denial of summary judgment on the ground
that Larson failed to meet the six-year statute of limitations. Id. Williams claimed that Larson's
knowledge of the stray voltage problem was a question of law; however, the North Dakota Supreme
Court disagreed, ruling that summary judgment was inappropriate because material questions of fact
existed as to when Larson knew of facts which would place a reasonable person on notice that a
potential claim existed and was caused by Williams' negligence. Id.
583. Id. (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring).
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. Larson, 534 N.W.2d at 5-6.
587. 535 N.W.2d 729 (N.D. 1995).
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Dakota Supreme Court, finding that the procedure violated neither
chapter 27-09.1 nor the Sixth Amendment, affirmed the conviction. 591
On April 24, 1994, while attempting to inflict serious bodily injury
on Victor Tayen, Robles shot Lee Alanis, causing substantial bodily
harm to Alanis.592 Robles was charged with aggravated assault, under
section 12.1-17-02(3) of the North Dakota Century Code. 59 3 Prior to
trial, Robles moved to dismiss the criminal information claiming that
Hispanics are "systematically excluded from jury service in Walsh
County and, therefore, a trial in Walsh County would deny Robles his
statutory and constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury."594 The
trial court denied this motion and a jury ultimately convicted Robles of
aggravated assault.595
The North Dakota Supreme Court distinguished the Sixth Amend-
ment claim from the alleged violation of chapter 27-09.1, addressing the
statutory claim first. 596 Initially, the court determined whether the jury
selection procedure in place in Walsh County complied with the require-
ments and procedures set forth in chapter 27-09.1 to compile and
maintain a master jury list.597 Under the jury selection plan in effect for
Robles' trial, the county clerk was required to compile the master list
from "the voters in the most recent general election and a list of licensed
drivers."598 Robles argued that the master list should have been supple-
mented with additional sources of names, such as utility bills, job service
records, or migrant school records.5 99 Despite this argument, the court
stated that Robles introduced no evidence which would tend to show that
the supplemental sources would produce a fairer cross-section than the
present system.600 Therefore, absent a directive from the court or other
compelling reason, the county clerk was not required to supplement the
list with other sources. 601
Addressing the constitutional challenge, the court noted that a
criminal defendant making a constitutional challenge to a jury selection
procedure must show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive'
group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
591. Id. at 730-31.
592. Id. at 731.
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group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that this under representation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection
process .602
Under the first element, the court stated that a group of people is distinct
when "the members of the group have a shared attribute that defines or
limits their membership and when they share a community of inter-
ests." 60 3 According to the court, Hispanics are considered a distinctive
group for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and thus, Robles success-
fully proved the first element of his constitutional challenge. 60 4
However, Robles did not present evidence revealing that Hispanics
have been underrepresented on jury venires. 605 Moreover, the court
found that even if Robles had shown that Hispanics were under-repre-
sented in Walsh County jury venires, he had failed to prove that Hispan-
ics were systematically excluded in the Walsh County jury selection
process. 606 To show systematic exclusion, Robles was required to show
that the exclusion was inherent in the particular jury selection process
utilized. 607 Conclusory observations and assertions are insufficient to
illustrate systematic exclusion. 608 As Robles did not meet his burden of
showing either disproportionate representation of Hispanics on jury
venires or systematic exclusion of Hispanics in the jury selection process,
his Sixth Amendment claim also failed. 60 9
JUVENILE LAW -TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
IN RE ADOPTION OF J.S.PL. v. WESSMAN
In re Adoption of J.S.P.L. v. Wessman,610 J.E.N. (Jack) appealed
from a judgment terminating his parental rights and granting the adop-
tion petition of M.L.L. (Mark) and S.M.L. (Sandy). 611 Finding clear
602. Id. at 732 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).
603. Robles, 535 N.W.2d at 732.
604. Id.
605. Id. at 733. Evidence presented by Robles consisted of: 1990 census data showing that of
the total adult population in Walsh County of the 10,023,213 were Hispanic; testimony by the clerk of
court and the Walsh County prosecuting attorney; and Walsh County jury reports. ld. at 732. This




608. Robles, 535 N.W.2d at 733.
609. Id. at 733-34.
610. 532 N.W.2d 653 (N.D. 1995).
611. In re Adoption of J.S.PL. v. Wessman, 532 N.W.2d 653, 655 (N.D. 1995). All pseudonyms
for the parties used here are the same as those used by the North Dakota Supreme Court opinion in the
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and convincing evidence to support the termination of Jack's parental
rights, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.6 12
Jack is the natural father of J.S.P.L. (Joan), J.J.L. (Jeff), and J.W.L.
(Justin).613 In January of 1992, after bribing his children to let him in,
Jack entered the house of his wife, PJ.N. (Patty) and, in the presence of
the children, shot her several times with a handgun when she returned
from work. 6 14 Patty died as a result of the gunshots. 615 For this crime,
Jack was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with
no possibility of parole for at least twenty-five years. 616 Shortly after the
murder, Sandy, Patty's sister, was awarded physical custody of the
children. 617 Sandy and her husband, Mark, sought to adopt the children
and terminate Jack's parental rights in December of 1993.618
At Jack's request, he was granted court-appointed counsel to
oppose the adoption.6 19 However, unsatisfied with counsel, Jack request-
ed the court to appoint an alternate attorney.620 This request was denied
by the court. 62 1 Jack's court-appointed counsel moved to have Jack
personally appear at the adoption hearing and for a continuance of the
hearing. 622 Mark and Sandy opposed this motion, arguing that Jack
posed "an obvious and significant security risk" and his presence would
add to the emotional and psychological trauma of the children, who were
testifying at the hearing. 623 Moreover, Jack would have the opportunity
to participate in the hearing through a deposition administered at the
state penitentiary.624
The trial court granted the motion for a continuance but denied the
motion for personal appearance citing the danger and security risk
associated with Jack's presence. 625 Jack responded by dismissing his
court-appointed attorney and electing to proceed pro se. 626 Jack also
case.
612. Id. at 656.
613. Id. at 655.
614. Id. at 656.
615. Id.










625. Id. The Court also looked at the additional inconvenience to the prison authorities. Id.
626. In re Adoption of JSPL., 532 N.W.2d at 656.
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canceled his deposition, which was scheduled to be taken at the peniten-
tiary. 627 In order to obtain Jack's cooperation, the trial court allowed
Jack to represent himself, but ordered the court-appointed counsel to
continue as Jack's legal advisor.628 In addition, the trial court allowed
Jack to appear by telephone at the hearing. 629 After receiving testimony,
the trial court terminated Jack's parental rights and granted the adop-
tion.630
On appeal, Jack argued "that the trial court violated his right to
access the courts by not allowing him to personally cross-examine the
witnesses at the adoption hearing." 63 1 According to the North Dakota
Supreme Court, the facts of this case implicated the constitutional rights
of self-representation and confrontation.632
Addressing the right to self-representation, the court recognized that
the criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to self-represen-
tation when the defendant knowingly and intelligently elects to proceed
pro se. 633 Yet, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-repre-
sentation:
is not violated when a trial judge appoints standby counsel over
the defendant's objection, so long as standby counsel's partici-
pation does not "effectively allow[ ] counsel to make or
substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or
to control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak instead of
the defendant on any matter of importance."634
Moreover, the court observed that the right to self-representation
does not guarantee the personal presence of the defendant at a civil
proceeding unrelated to his imprisonment. 635 Where the prisoner has
elected to proceed pro se, waiving his right to court-appointed counsel,
he may not later claim his constitutional right to self-representation has
been violated when he is denied the opportunity to appear personally in
627. Id.
628. Id. at 656-57.
629. Id. at 657. At the hearing, the trial court allowed Jack to orally argue the motions which he
had previously filed with the court. Id.
630. Id.
631. In reAdoption of J.S.P.L., 532 N.W.2d at 657.
632. Id. at 658.
633. Id.
634. Id. at 658-59 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168,178 (1984)).
635. Id. The court agreed that:
If it is apparent that the request of the prisoner to argue personally reflects something
more than a mere desire to be freed temporarily from the confines of the prison, that he
is capable of conducting an intelligent and responsible argument, and that his presence in
the courtroom may be secured without undue inconvenience or danger, the court would
be justified in [allowing the prisoner to appear personally.]
Id. (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 284-85 (1948)).
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a civil proceeding. 636 Accordingly, "Jack's invocation of his right to
self-representation did not create a correlative absolute right to personal-
ly appear at the adoption hearing." 637
Turning to the right to confrontation, the supreme court reiterated
that prisoners retain a due process right to reasonable access to the
courts, 638 but found that "a prisoner does not have an absolute consti-
tutional right to personally appear in court and defend an action to
terminate parental rights if the prisoner has been otherwise permitted to
appear through counsel and by deposition." 639 Rather, the court
concluded that the personal appearance of a prisoner at these proceed-
ings is discretionary with the trial court.640
Although the Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, that right does not extend to
civil proceedings for termination of parental rights.641 According to the
court, the right to confront and cross-examine "are not rights universal-
ly applicable to all hearings. '"642 Although the denial of the opportunity
to cross-examine in a parental rights case invokes due process concerns,
the court found that "due process does not entitle a parent to personally
confront and cross-examine a child witness if the child would be trauma-
tized by the experience." 643
Balancing the important public interest at stake against Jack's
procedural due process right, the court concluded that the trial court did
not violate Jack's constitutional rights by denying his request to appear
personally. 644 In making this determination, the court pointed to the
trial court's concern over the potential danger and security risk, the
resulting inconvenience on the prison authorities, and the substantial
state interest in the emotional and psychological welfare of the
children.645 In conclusion, the court found that the procedure fashioned
by the trial court adequately addressed Jack's due process and Sixth
Amendment rights, and thus, did not deny Jack reasonable access to the
courts .646
636. In re Adoption of JS.P.L., 532 N.W.2d at 659-60.
637. Id. at 660.
638. Id. at 657 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977)).
639. Id. (citing In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202, 209 (N.D. 1979)).
640. Id. at 658. The North Dakota Supreme Court lists several factors to be taken into account
when the trial court exercises its discretion in this area. Id. at 658 n.3 (citing In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d
202,209 (N.D. 1979)).
641. In re Adoption of JS.P.L., 532 N.W.2d at 660 (citations omitted).
642. Id. (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,567 (1974)).
643. Id.
644. Id. at 662.
645. Id. at 662-63.
646. In re Adoption of J.S.P.L., 532 N.W.2d at 662-63.
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